


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
AMERICAN AND SOVIET SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA: AN EFFECTIVENESS APPRAISAL (U) ARMY COMMAND AND
GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS H L SMITH
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American and Soviet Security Assistance in Sub-Saharan
Africa: An Effectiveness Appraisal

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

MICHAEL LARMAS SMITH, MAJOR, USA
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1975
M.A., University of North Carolina, 1984

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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ABSTRACT

AMERICAN AND SOVIET SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AN EFFECTIVENESS APPRAISAL: by Major Michael L. Smith, USA, 168 pages.

Using enhancement of global and regional objectives, procurement of military base rights, and benefits to the recipient state as effectiveness criteria, this study concludes that the security assistance program of the Soviet Union has been more effective in sub-saharan Africa than its American counterpart. After comparing the general character of American and Soviet security assistance efforts throughout the world, this analysis then identifies the global aspirations of each superpower. These findings provide the foundation for applying the effectiveness criteria. The states of sub-saharan Africa are then grouped into three regions. The ensuing region by region examination yields conclusive regional assessments, as well as the overall effectiveness appraisal for American and Soviet security assistance programs in sub-saharan Africa noted above.

**American and Soviet Security Assistance in Sub-Saharan
Africa: An Effectiveness Appraisal**

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
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
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


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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

AMERICAN AND SOVIET SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AN EFFECTIVENESS APPRAISAL: by Major Michael L. Smith, USA, 170 pages.

Using enhancement of global and regional objectives, procurement of military base rights, and benefits to the recipient state as effectiveness criteria, this study ~~study~~ ^{there} concludes that the security assistance program of the Soviet Union has been more effective in sub-saharan Africa than its American counterpart. After comparing the general character of American and Soviet security assistance efforts throughout the world, this analysis then identifies the global aspirations of each superpower. These findings provide the foundation for applying the effectiveness criteria. The states of sub-saharan Africa are then grouped into three regions. The ensuing region by region examination yields conclusive regional assessments, as well as the overall effectiveness appraisal for American and Soviet security assistance programs in sub-saharan Africa noted above.

Keywords: foreign policy, geopolitics, international relations, Africa

FOREWORD


My deepest thanks and gratitude go out to Brigitte (my best friend and wife), and my sons Xavier and Preston for doing all that they could to help me complete this project. The African students here at the Command and General Staff College also bear mentioning as they answered the many questions I asked them which gave me a special perspective on the topic addressed herein. Finally, a big thanks to my thesis committee. They were highly supportive and frequently contributed their time and resources for my benefit.

I undertook this project for three main reasons: to learn more about Africa; to learn more about the global aspirations (and tactics to achieve them) of the Soviet Union, and to develop a sensing for what lies ahead for Africa in the next two decades. I feel fulfilled on all three counts, and enjoyed the process from start to finish. I was genuinely surprised by my own conclusions in Chapter Eight, and this has whet my interest to study the subject further.

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MAP OF AFRICA



CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Part One: Background

Part Two: The Problem and its Significance

Part Three: Definition of Terms

Part Four: Limitations and Delimitations

Part One: Background

"The United States should acquire new military capabilities to protect its vital interests in critical regions of Africa and its adjoining areas, notably the Persian Gulf."¹

The citation above, drawn from a study completed in 1980 by the respected Strategic Studies Center, underscores the increasing importance of Africa in the minds of many American policy planners. The Soviet Union seems to possess a similar view of Africa as evidenced by its extensive security assistance programs in the region. As a result of these views, sub-saharan Africa has become a region of intense geopolitical competition between the superpowers. Oftentimes, the efforts expended here have worldwide implications. Indeed, General Sir John Hackett, author of the best-selling book, The Third World War, ominously predicts that events in sub-saharan Africa will be the impetuses of World War III.² Seeming to fulfill this prophecy, the last decade has yielded a dramatic increase in American and Soviet involvement on this continent. At stake are some of the world's most mineral rich areas, strategically important locations, and politically /economically important spheres of influence. The research problem stated below addresses one of the more salient aspects of these new developments.

Part Two: The Problem and its Significance

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of American and Soviet security assistance programs in sub-saharan Africa. Three findings of this inquiry have significance.

First, this study will be of utility to U.S. military planners. By determining the character of Soviet security assistance in Africa using a region-by-region approach, this study offers planners a comprehensive view of the Soviet Union's overall intents, both continentally and globally, than do the more numerous state-by-state approaches.

Secondly, this study expands the breadth of knowledge held by security assistance specialists. In terms of security assistance, Africa is an infrequently studied area. Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia all get significantly more attention than Africa. Few will argue, however, that many of these security assistance efforts are interconnected. For example, the U.S. decision to aid Jonas Savimbi's UNITA fighters in Angola was based upon the same reasoning as its decision to aid the Contras of Nicaragua. So, those planners unfamiliar with current U.S. military assistance programs in Africa may, in the future, find themselves turning to studies such as this one

for perspectives on the formulation of security assistance programs elsewhere.

Finally, the results of this study will expand the depth of knowledge held by U.S. African security assistance specialists as it (a) is an assessment based on the most current data which they are unlikely to have evaluated in such a manner, and (b) the U.S.-Soviet comparison in this study uses a unique criteria to measure effectiveness. Before proceeding, it may be necessary to delineate the effectiveness criteria, and to define several other terms which may need clarification.

Part Three: Definition of Terms

The term security assistance was defined here as the efforts undertaken by a state: to assist supported states in preserving their independence; to promote regional stability; to help obtain basing rights, overseas facilities, and air-land-sea transit rights; to ensure access to critical markets and raw materials; and to provide a means to expand its political and economic influence.³ The term military assistance was used interchangeably with the term security assistance throughout this analysis.

Sub-saharan Africa was defined herein as Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and all the

states and islands of Africa which lie to the south of these states.

As this study focused on determining the effectiveness of the security assistance programs of the United States and the USSR in sub-saharan Africa, a clear understanding of the measures of effectiveness was important. The following four areas were evaluated for each region of sub-saharan Africa to subjectively determine the effectiveness of the security program in question:

1. How well did the security assistance programs in each of the states of a given region contribute to the US's/USSR's regional objectives?
2. How well did the security assistance program in a given region contribute to the US's/USSR's global objectives?
3. How strong were the levels of interaction between the US/USSR and the assisted states of the region?
 - (a) What was the form of this interaction?
 - long term vs. short term treaty
 - ad hoc agreement/arrangement
 - (b) To what extent was the US/USSR allowed to project power into or out of the region:
 - basing rights for forces
 - overflight rights
 - refueling rights
 - usage of facilities for military purposes
 - permission to preposition military stock
4. How well did the assisted state/region benefit from the security assistance program? (expected vs. actual outcomes).

Part Four: Limitations and Delimitations

This study was limited by several factors. First, no classified data were used. This was to ensure that protected information was not accidentally disclosed. This was not a major limitation as several former CIA agents have revealed a great deal of previously highly classified information on US and Soviet security assistance in Africa. A related limiting factor was the Soviet penchant for secrecy. Much of the data that the United States routinely publishes for the general public has no parallel in the Soviet "information" scheme. Here too there were other sources which provided reliable estimates of Soviet activity.

One of the most confounding variables in such an endeavor is the truth. Truth is often the first casualty in reports on military activities "surrendered" by governments. Recent events like the Iran-Contra affair have again demonstrated to us that even the United States has liabilities in this area.

This study was delimited in time in that it examined only those American and Soviet security assistance operations present in Africa from post-World War II to 1987. Additionally, the effectiveness appraisal focused almost

exclusively on the criteria described in the definition of terms discussion above.

Having discussed the important framework upon which this study was based, the following examination of related literature and an explanation of this study's methodology allow a more earnest evaluation of the issues addressed in subsequent chapters.

NOTES

1. Kenneth L. Adelman, African Realities, (New York: Crane, Russak, and Co., 1980), p. viii.
2. General Sir John Hackett, The Third World War - August 1985, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. 1978).
3. Harold A. Hovey, United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices, (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. vi.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

Part One: Literature Review

Part Two: Methodology

Part One: Literature Review

Having established that Africa is, comparatively, an infrequently studied area, it should now be noted that selected aspects of this research problem have received generous attention in books and articles. These works will be evaluated using the following categorization: writings on Africa and arms transfers in general; U.S. military involvement in Africa; and Soviet military involvement in Africa.

Arms Transfers in General

Any study on arms and Africa must begin with the extensive writings of Bruce E. Arlinghaus. This author, a U.S. army officer, has combined his military training with extensive studies of the region to produce several books and articles of great value. Arms For Africa, a book edited by Dr. Arlinghaus in 1983, provided an excellent starting point for this analysis. This book combines the writings of several well known authors in this field and thus provided a wealth of background information. Several chapters proved to be particularly elucidating: Edward J. Laurance's "Soviet Arms Transfers in the 1980s: Declining Influence in Sub-saharan Africa"; Cynthia A. Cannizzo's "Western Approaches to Military Assistance to Sub-saharan Africa: An Overview"; and Joseph P. Smaldone's "U.S. Arms Transfers and

Security Assistance Programs in Africa: A Review and Policy Perspective".

Bruce E. Arlinghaus and co-editor Pauline H. Baker's African Armies: Evolution And Capabilities (1986) was an important find as it yielded insight into the dynamics of the organizations receiving the military assistance-African armies. This proved to be particularly helpful in evaluating the effectiveness of US/Soviet military assistance. Arlinghaus' Military Development in Africa: The Political And Economic Risks of Arms Transfers (1984), was also helpful in evaluating the effectiveness of super-power arms transfers to sub-saharan Africa. These two books are excellent in their examination of the inner workings of African militaries and in their assessments of the benefits and costs of arms transfers vis-a-vis the recipient states.

The extensive works of Stephanie G. Neuman also require mention here. Dr. Neuman's Arms Transfers in the Modern World (1980; co-edited with Robert E. Harkavy) and Military Assistance in Recent Wars: The Dominance of the Superpowers (1986) are two excellent references. Military Assistance in Recent Wars: The Dominance of the Superpowers is one of the most current books on this topic. It benefited greatly from recent revelations exposing a number of previously unknown aspects of US military assistance. More importantly, by offering a "report card" on the roles that US and Soviet military assistance have played in recent wars, Ms. Neuman

pursued a theme which is quite similar to the central purpose of this study. Hence, it proved to be an invaluable find.

The Global Politics Of Arms Sales (1982) by Andrew J. Pierre contains an important chapter on Africa. Mr. Pierre's contribution to this research effort centers not only on the Africa chapter, but on the unique perspectives he offers in several other chapters which assess current arms sales trends as well as motivations for arms sales. He convincingly contrasts the reasons for successful and unsuccessful arms transfers in Africa by drawing upon other third world examples.

Edward A. Kolodziej has written extensively on arms transfers since 1961. Security Policies of Developing Countries (1982), a book he co-edited with well known author Robert E. Harkavy, contains two in-depth studies on the security policies of Nigeria and South Africa. The resulting analyses are highly illustrative and significant in that they offer an analysis of sub-saharan Africa's most populous black-ruled state (Nigeria) versus sub-saharan Africa's only white-ruled state (South Africa). The findings offered in these chapters were particularly useful in evaluating the US and Soviet military assistance efforts in West Africa and Southern Africa.

Several periodicals also contained assessments which were important contributions to this study. African Defence

Journal contained several articles which offered current detailed information on US and Soviet security assistance efforts in Africa. "American Security Assistance to Africa in FY 1983", American Strategy in Africa: Bilateral, Selective Cooperation", and "Soviet Strategy in Africa: Bilateral Agreements", are indicative of the types of articles this journal offers.

The Conflict Studies series was another excellent source as it drew upon the expertise of several accomplished Africanist scholars and former diplomats. Each of the studies offered an in-depth analysis of an issue of major concern in Africa: "The Communist Powers in Africa", "The Contentious Horn of Africa", and "Soviet Penetration of Africa" are three such studies.

U.S. Military Involvement in Africa

When it was published in 1979, Dirty Works 2: The CIA in Africa, caused great furor in and out of the U.S. government. Several former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents were among the thirty-plus authors who contributed expository articles and essays to this book. Many U.S. government/CIA secrets were revealed and as a result, readers were allowed to view U.S. military involvement in Africa "with all of the cards on the table". Hence this book proved to be an excellent point of departure for several assessments conducted in this study. One of the

many strengths of this book is that it shows the interconnectivity (and sometimes a lack thereof) of the Western world's military intelligence complex in Africa. A weakness must also be cited: the editors seem to have focused upon the negative aspects of Western involvement in Africa to the near total exclusion of some "successful" African programs. Nevertheless, such deficiencies notwithstanding, this book contained some crucially important information.

Kenneth L. Adelman's African Realities (1980) is another important work which assesses U.S. military involvement in Africa. Ironically, it was an effective counter-balance to the anti-neocolonialist orientation of Dirty Work 2: The CIA In Africa. Dr. Adelman, a security affairs professional, tends to view Africa as a major part of the global East-West dispute. The great value of his study lies in his attempts to extrapolate from post-World War II history and more recent events, a view of how the United States should conduct itself politically, militarily, and economically in Africa in the future. Some of his long range forecasts have found validity in events currently taking place in Africa.

One of the most insightful treatments of U.S. security assistance in general and U.S. security assistance policies in Africa is Harold A. Hovey's United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices (1966). This

analysis provided a thorough historical foundation from which to evaluate current U.S. security assistance initiatives any place in the world. Through extensive research, Mr. Hovey compiled a wealth of facts and figures in an attempt to make his book a resource for anyone studying the United States' military aid program. By today's standards however, his writings may be judged to be flawed by the author's obsessive disdain for communism. Like Kenneth Adelman, Mr. Hovey views the world as two entities, East and West. His interpretation of this conflict proved to be quite useful as some of the solutions he proposed to the manifestations of this conflict in Africa are remarkably similar to some proposals and policies which are popular today. Finally, Lieutenant General Ernest Graves and Steven A. Hildreth's U.S. Security Assistance: The Political Process (1985) was a unique and valuable source for this study. With great clarity, it revealed the complex relationship between U.S. military involvement in Africa and the effects that American public opinion, interest groups and Congress have on security assistance programs. This proved to be particularly helpful in writing Chapter 3 as well as portions of the subsequent chapters.

Soviet Military Involvement in Africa

A wealth of literature exists on the topic of Soviet military involvement in Africa. Not too suprisingly, very little of the available literature is written by the Soviets themselves. This deficiency has been overcome by a wealth of writings which analyze not Soviet rhetoric, but actual Soviet actions in Africa. One such work is The Soviet Impact In Africa (1984), edited by R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi. Drawing upon the expertise of several noted scholars in the field, the editors have managed to compile one of the most thorough studies on this topic. Of particular note are the chapters on "The Soviet Union's Encounter with Africa" by Colin Legum, R. Craig Nation's "Soviet Engagement in Africa: Motives, Means, and Prospects", "Soviet Arms Transfers to Sub-saharan Africa" by Joachim Krause, and Richard B. Rennek's, "The Significance of Soviet Strategic Military Interests in Sub-saharan Africa". Considered together, these articles were at the vanguard of the trend to cease examining all of the actions of the superpowers in Africa as outgrowths of the East-West dispute. Additionally, there is a diversity of opinions contained in The Soviet Impact in Africa which served to enrich the discussions in several of the following chapters.

Morris Rothenberg's The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power (1981) also made a

significant contribution to this study. Its greatest value proved to be the analyses of the Soviet military role in Southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, and Equatorial Africa. The author used a variety of Soviet primary and secondary references to assist in conveying a balanced assessment of events in those regions. Rothenberg's work stands out from others due to his continuous attempt to identify patterns and show relationships among the Soviet Union's regional policies in Africa. One deficiency in his assessments may have been his interpretation of the Soviet perspective on The Republic of South Africa. His portrayal of the Soviet Union's intentions there are sometimes overly sinister and tenuously argued.

Communism in Africa (1980), edited by David E.

Albright, was a major contributor to this study for many of the same reasons as The Soviet Impact in Africa and The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power. It significantly added to the field of study of Soviet military involvement in Africa by examining the African-American nexus in Soviet strategy, the historic stake of the Soviet Union in Africa, and finally it "reversed the mirror" by examining African outlooks toward the USSR. Dr. Albright's book benefits greatly from his own past extensive analyses of communism as well as from the pioneering analyses on communism in Africa by Dr. Albright's mentors. The works of one of these mentors, Zbigniew Brzezinski must still be

central to any review of Soviet military involvement in Africa.

Africa and the Communist World (1964), edited by Zbigniew Brzezinski, continues to be required reading for research into Soviet military involvement in Africa. It was written at a time of great ideological activity on the continent and reflects the political and economic struggles which took place in Africa in the 1960s. All of the contributors to this volume were well versed in communist source material. Unfortunately, a weakness in African research was also noticed, but herein lied the book's value: it is indicative of the Africa-naivete characteristic of most policy makers of the time. Much of the U.S.'s policies and the USSR's policies toward Africa have been formulated by officials who were well acquainted with the political dogma of the other superpower but much less familiar with the dynamics of African societies and African governments. As a result, U.S. and Soviet policy execution in Africa has often been a source of frustration for policy makers. In the final analysis, this book epitomizes "the old school" of foreign policy analysis.²

Dan C. Heldman's The USSR and Africa: Foreign Policy Under Khrushchev (1981) made a major contribution to Chapter 3 of this study owing to its evaluation of the formulation of Soviet foreign policy on Africa during the Khrushchev period. This was an important period because it was the

formative period of Soviet policy toward Africa. It is the most in-depth assessment of its type, and it provides an effective counterweight to Africa and the Communist World. A particularly noteworthy theme found in this book identifies the ineffectiveness of Soviet economic aid and the vast cultural asymmetries which seem to continually force the Soviets to focus on military aid as a means to maintain influence in the region.

In summary, a review of the literature revealed useful information in book and article form, relating to various aspects of this study. There were no works found which compared the effectiveness of American and Soviet military assistance in Sub-saharan Africa. The only void in the literature (though some works exist)³ was the area of African perceptions of the military assistance they receive. This deficiency notwithstanding, a more than adequate number of writings were located to allow the conduct of a broad-based inquiry into the issues identified in the following chapters.

Part Two: Methodology

The method of determining the effectiveness of American and Soviet security assistance programs in sub-saharan is explained in two phases. Phase one involved the method of data collection. This study used the author's

field research in Africa, his conversations with several African diplomats at the United Nations, and most importantly, books, periodicals, newspaper articles, and government documents found in libraries as the foundation of his data collection effort.

Phase two involved structuring a "pathway" which would logically allow conclusions to be made on the effectiveness of American and Soviet security assistance in sub-saharan Africa. This path begins in Chapter 3 where the general characteristics of the U.S.'s and the USSR's security assistance programs are described. The components of each of these programs is discussed as well as their relationship to each country's foreign policy. This allows a more informed comparison of the US's/USSR's security assistance program in a given region of Africa. Chapter 4 continues by describing the US's and USSR's interests and objectives in sub-saharan Africa. This allowed an evaluation of factor one of the effectiveness appraisal.⁴ Chapters 5 through 7 use the four measures of effectiveness discussed in Chapter 1 to appraise the US's/USSR's security assistance programs in Southern Africa; The Horn of Africa, Sudan, and East Africa; and West Africa and Equatorial Africa respectively. Each of these chapters ends with an effectiveness appraisal of the US and USSR for that region. Chapter 8 synthesizes these conclusions and thus allows for an overall effectiveness appraisal to be made.

The beginning of any journey begins with the proverbial first step. Identifying the US's/USSR's geopolitical interests is the first step of this appraisal, and as will be seen later, it was the the most important one.

NOTES

1. The term successful is used here to note those programs which, though focused on military assistance, had the effect of improving the political, economic, and social quality of life of the inhabitants of a given state or region.

2. The phrase "old school" is used here to refer to the inclination of most post-World War II foreign policy analysts to interpret global events, and formulate policy primarily within the framework of the East-West dispute. This was based, in part, on their sensing that communism was a monolithic entity.

3. Bruce E. Arlinghaus' Military Development in Africa: The Political and Economic Risks of Arms Transfers referred to earlier is one such book. Ali Mazrui's The Africans bears mentioning here because it is representative of much of the literature written by Africans on this subject. As such, it is characteristic of a body of work which blames the Western arms trade for most of the assassinations, coup d'etats, and civil wars of Africa. Though there is some merit in aspects of this argument, when applied on a case-by-case basis, it becomes largely unsupportable.

4. See page 4, chapter 1.

CHAPTER THREE

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

OF THE

UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION:

A BRIEF SUMMARY

- Part One: Components of American and Soviet Security Assistance Programs
- Part Two: Post-World War II to 1960
- Part Three: 1961 to 1976
- Part Four: 1977 to Present
- Part Five: A Comparison of Characteristics

Prior to evaluating the security assistance programs of the United States and the Soviet Union as they apply to Africa, it is first necessary to determine the general character of each of these programs. The following summary reveals major contrasts in the purpose, characteristics, and challenges faced by each of these programs. As a result, this chapter provides tools which should be used to assess security assistance actions discussed in subsequent chapters.

Part One: Components of American and Soviet Security Assistance Programs ¹

American Programs

The current global scope of the US security assistance program sprang from decidedly less ambitious roots. Beginning with the Lend-Lease program of March 1941 to August 1945, the United States steadily increased its global commitments with the following acts and programs: the post-World War II Rehabilitation-14.5 billion dollars to help reconstruct war torn areas; the Greece-Turkey Aid Act of 1947-also known as the Truman Doctrine; the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948-also known as the Marshall Plan; aid to Asia including Nationalist China (China Aid Act of 1948, 463 million dollars), the Philippines, and South Korea; the Mutual Defense Act of 1949 which involved three types of

grant military aid; the Mutual Security Act of 1951 which established the position of the Director of Mutual Security in the Department of State to supervise all military, economic and technical assistance programs; and the Mutual Security Act of 1954 which made further changes in the administration of the security assistance program.

The statutory basis for current US security assistance programs is found in the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. The FAA is the authorizing legislation for the five major programs associated with US security assistance: the Military Assistance Program (MAP), the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, the Economic Support Fund (ESF), the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Financing program, and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).

MAP is a grant financing program extended to selected countries to procure defense equipment and services. This program has seldom received, figuratively speaking, more than a "wink and a nod" in appropriations.

IMET also receives little resourcing. It is used to train foreign military personnel in the United States, in their own countries, or sometimes in a third country. This program accomplishes much in improving understanding between the armed forces of the United States and the supported state. Friendships are formed, good values are passed on, and a strong base for future relationships is established.

As this analysis focuses on the military portion of security assistance, the ESF will be periodically mentioned, but not extensively explored. Based on the premise that a nation's security is largely a function of its economic health, the ESF provides balance of payments and budget support to enhance the recipient state's economic and political stability. It is administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) and focuses on the infrastructures which will best provide a foundation for continued economic growth. As such, it cannot be used for defense equipment; nevertheless, it can have the effect of allowing the recipient government to divert monies which would have been spent on the economy, to the defense sector.

The FMS program authorizes government agencies to sell arms to selected states/organizations. As many states which are likely to need security assistance do not have the money to buy defense goods or services, loans can be acquired under the credit program of FMS. These loans are financed at current market rates and require the purchaser to buy the sought after goods or services from US firms. This is the most used of the five major programs.

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) are efforts like the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), the US contingent to the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and several others geared towards maintaining the peace of a given state or region by the interpositioning of non-hostile

forces there. Though they bear mention here, PKO will not be a factor in subsequent discussions.

A word on the complex set of organizations involved in the formulation of US security assistance programs is in order. Extensive coordination between the Department of State, the Defense Department, the Commerce Department, and the Treasury Department is involved on each program. A number of other agencies may become involved if systems or technologies under their jurisdictions are being considered. Most importantly however, the Congress, with its power of the purse, often determines the substantive character of a program. With so many actors involved, it is often difficult to develop an "effective" program. The Soviet Union has no parallel to this system.

Soviet Programs

The following citation reveals why the detailed discussion above concerning the components of the US security assistance program cannot be accurately repeated for the Soviet Union:

"As a rule, Soviet scholars do not discuss the scale, scope, financial details or motives behind Soviet arms sales. The USSR does not publish arms trade data and the Soviet press provides no substantive information on specific arms deals."²

In essence, the components of the two systems have much in common. Parts two through five will clearly outline the similarities and differences between them.

Part Two: Post-World War II to 1960

The American security assistance program during this period was based upon an altruistic foundation. Prior to its entry into World War II, the United States served as the "Arsenal of Democracy" in support of "free" peoples of the world. This sentiment was carried over into the post-World War II era with one new addition: vast stockpiles of surplus war materiel. Hence, MAP-like grants of military equipment could easily be made to a variety of states in Europe and Latin America. In virtually all cases, there was one central motivation in providing this aid: a desire to contain the hegemonic and imperialistic geopolitics of the USSR. The Truman Doctrine was the first manifestation of this desire. It clearly enunciated the US's intentions to provide military support to the governments of free peoples to counter [communist] subversion. Turkey and Greece shared 600 million dollars and received 927 American military advisors towards this end.

The Marshall Plan was also part of this effort. 16 European nations received over 15 billion dollars in loans and grants under this plan which yielded several benefits.

The NATO alliance was being bolstered, NATO interoperability was significantly enhanced, a system of worldwide US military bases began to develop, and the US policy of containment seemed to be meeting the challenges of the Cold War. But this was only one-half of the equation as the costs of such policies were rapidly becoming burdensome.

President Eisenhower also pursued the policy of containment, but did so under the notion of "security with solvency". The implementation of the "massive retaliation" strategy of defense coincided with efforts to decrease the costs of general purpose forces, forward deployed forces, and security assistance. Despite strictures, the US broadened its security assistance program to include "friends" in addition to "allies". The main difference from the Truman administration laid in the Eisenhower administration's greater reliance on FMS-like programs to reduce the costs of defense materiel transfers incurred by the US when MAPs prevailed.

The Soviet Union's security assistance program began in 1954, and appeared to be a reaction to US containment policy successes.³ At first they targeted non-aligned states which could help them break the "threat" posed by the Baghdad Pact (also known as the Central Treaty Organization-CENTO)⁴. This accounted for their support of Egypt's Nasser despite his antipathy for the Egyptian Communist Party, and for the inauguration of Soviet aid to India. So, ideological

altruism was not, at this point, a major factor in extending aid.

Interestingly, Soviet economic aid was roughly equal to military aid in this period. The Soviets used an FMS-like system to sell arms on credit, at low interest rates (2.5%), with amortization periods of 10-12 years, and with repayment permitted in the customer's currency.⁵ Though most of the arms delivered were obsolete, when combined with economic aid, they assisted the USSR in gaining political influence in the supported country.

Part Three: 1961 to 1976

This decade opened with a major shift in US defense policy. President Kennedy, concerned that the massive retaliation policy was not adaptable to the wide spectrum of challenges which faced the US, adopted the policy of "flexible response". Coincidentally, the world became smaller during this administration as the United States undertook a variety of initiatives on a global scale. The motivation for these actions was comparable to the motivations for the foreign policies of the two previous administrations: containment. For example, the Alliance for Progress program attempted to speed economic growth in several Latin American countries so they would be less susceptible to [communist] subversion. Furthermore,

Eisenhower's concern for solvency was also held by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. The costs of maintaining the United States' forward deployed forces overseas was impacting adversely on America's balance of payments. This prompted both presidents to repeatedly request that NATO countries share more of the burden for their own defense. Hence, the shift away from MAP-type (grants) security assistance and towards FMS-type (sales) security assistance initiated by Eisenhower, was accelerated by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson:

Figure 3-1: MAP to FMS Ratio, 1961 vs. 1966 (6)

	<u>Grant Aid</u>	<u>Military Sales</u>
1961	\$1.5 billion	\$630 million
1966	\$824 million	\$1.9 billion

The FMS to MAP ratio continued to increase during the Nixon administration. A portion of President Nixon's foreign policy doctrine required the indigenous forces of a supported ally/friend to provide for self-defense while the United States provided materiel and economic assistance, but not soldiers. Much of this orientation was attributable to America's disaffection with assistance policies associated with the Vietnam War. The introspection which followed the

war led to Congress's assumption of a much greater role in the formulation of security assistance programs.

The Arms Export Control Act was the most important legislation of this period. Passed in 1976, one of its provisions prohibited arms transfers to any state found to be in systematic violation of human rights. This may have reflected the American concern about the morality of arms sales, and few could have sensed that the ensuing years were to be characterized by even more rigid controls on security assistance. Ironically, the Soviets were moving in the opposite direction.

Global expansion of the communist ideology consistently dominated the foreign policy of the Soviet Union during these years. CPSU leader Nikita Krushchev vowed support for wars of national liberation, and his successor Leonid Brezhnev promulgated a doctrine which intimated that the Soviet Union would use military force to prevent socialist states from "leaving the fold". As a result of these two policies, Soviet military aid grew to twice the amount of economic aid. Geopolitics also seemed to be a factor in their security assistance efforts. The Soviet involvements in Southern Africa and Southeast Asia are often attributed to their desire to counter Western advantages in these regions.

The Soviet desire to acquire hard currency was another motivation for their aid policies. The inconvertability of

the ruble has always required the Soviet Union to acquire hard currency to pay its trade bills. As a result, the ideological beacon of their foreign policy began to dim in the light of a more flexible pragmatic approach. Their support of several conservative regimes with strong ties to the West was indicative of this shift: Iran (1967, 1973), Pakistan (1968), and Kuwait (1977).

Part Four: 1977 to Present

The International Security Act of 1977 greatly restructured the security assistance program of the United States. Executive level administrative changes were complemented by the establishment of a set of controls which limited Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) activities. MAAGs were seen as having run amok during the previous decade. This legislation clearly manifested the Carter administration's deep concern that conventional weaponry was spreading throughout the world uncontrollably. In a radical departure from previous administrations, President Carter declared that arms transfers were henceforth to be viewed as "exceptional" foreign policy implements. The combination of this position with President Carter's intensified emphasis on human rights had dramatic impacts on the United States' security assistance policy.

President Reagan reversed President Carter's policies. The Reagan administration's primary military objectives for security assistance are: to assist countries in preserving their independence; promote regional stability; help obtain base rights, overseas facilities, and transit rights; ensure access to critical raw materials; and provide a means to expand U.S. influence.⁷ Furthermore, he views arms sales as an essential element of the global struggle against communism. The MAP program has been revived, and though human rights is still an important criterion, pragmatism reigns. Hence, the current security assistance policy of the United States allows transfer of defense materiel only if such transfers will:

- * Reinforce military capabilities to assist in the deterrence of aggression, especially from the USSR and its surrogates, and reduce the requirement for direct US involvement in regional conflict.
- * Reinforce the perception of friends and allies that the US, as a partner, is also a reliable supplier with an enduring stake in the security of the recipient country, and to potential enemies that the US will not abandon its allies or friends or allow them to be militarily disadvantaged.
- * Improve the American economy by assuring a more stable defense production base and enhance the balance of payments. However, this objective should not be construed that the approval of the transfer of arms will be based solely on economic considerations and gains.
- * Enhance the effectiveness of the US military through improved possibilities of access to regional bases, ports or facilities needed for support of deployed forces during contingencies. Further,

security assistance should be such as to improve the ability of host nations to complement US forces during deployment.

- * Strengthen the stability of a region and the internal security of the countries therein by fostering a sense of a recipient nation's security and thereby its willingness to settle disputes amicably.⁸

The Reagan administration's message is clear: the United States is not going to allow communism to gain another inch of territory anywhere in the world.

Soviet arms sales were five times greater than the economic aid rendered during this period.⁹ This has caused some to conclude that Soviet arms transfer policies are strongly shaped by economic motives. A 1978 CIA report states that, "Almost all the arms for commodities trade of earlier years has given way to payments in hard currency."¹⁰ This would explain the opportunistic manner in which the Soviet Union now seems to conduct its aid programs. Nevertheless, the Soviet presence in Africa and elsewhere confirms that strategic concerns continue to play a major role in their foreign policy.

Part Five: A Comparison of Characteristics

The United States and the Soviet Union have a variety of similarities in their security assistance programs. An examination of five areas: motives, constraints, type of materiel and training transferred, delivery characteristics,

and reliability, will identify these similarities and some differences as well.

Each of these superpowers' security assistance programs seems to be motivated by a combination of geopolitical, ideological, and economic factors. Both states seek to expand their political influence and to acquire overseas bases and facilities through their aid programs. The Soviet Union relies heavily on arms sales to achieve these objectives, whereas the United States appears to have a much more credible range of political, economic, and diplomatic tools to protect its interests. As identified above, though the ideological component always seems to be present, its role changes. The communist ideology contains expansionist obligations, but only the most dogmatic leaders feel bound to these notions. There are no such messianic tendencies in democracy. Economically, both states have repeatedly shown concern about the relationship between their security assistance program and their balance of payments. The Soviet Union is further motivated economically by its need to procure hard currency to pay its debts to the West and its other trading partners. The United States values the positive impact that the security assistance programs have on the US defense industry base. By being required to build arms and other defense materiel to support the program, the US defense base indirectly maintains its readiness for a possible full-scale industrial mobilization in the future.

So, it appears that the motives for each of these states are quite similar. This is not the case with the constraints, however, as the United States conducts its program under limitations that could scarcely be imagined in the Soviet Union. First, Americans are by nature isolationistic. Hence, there is no natural constituency for foreign aid as there is for domestic programs. Secondly, over time the United States has assumed the role of defender of human rights around the world. Consequently, the United States is not likely (though it sometimes does) to extend military aid to a state which fails to observe these rights. Thirdly, and somewhat related to the human rights issue, is the recurring concern that arms sales are immoral; this theme was present along with the human rights theme during the Carter administration. Finally, the democratic process is a limit in that the approved program is usually a political resultant which may have lost a lot of its substance in the legislative process. The Soviet Union has no such political or moral constraints. Their structure of government operates much more efficiently in this regard, though perhaps not as effectively. This notwithstanding, both states share self-imposed limits in a number of areas. Neither state will allow arms-making technology to be exported and, both are careful not to equip supported states with weapons that will substantially escalate a conflict.¹¹

In terms of materiel, the United States seems to be more willing to transfer newer and more sophisticated equipment than the USSR. Whenever either country transfers sophisticated arms, an "export version" is always sent so that certain weapon characteristics are not compromised. Interestingly, the United States and the Soviet Union have substantial differences in the costs breakdown associated with transferring defense materiel:

The US charges: 35% to pay for acquisition of the materiel/system; 35% for spare parts and ammunition ; 30% for training, advisors, and related services.

The USSR charges: 70-80% to pay for acquisition of materiel/system; 20% for spare parts, ammunition, training, etc.¹²

These differences may occur because the Soviet equipment is reputed to be simpler to operate and more easily maintained. This may also account for IMET-type training differences; defense analyst Stephanie Neuman notes that, "The American military education program is the largest in the world...counting only military personnel from combatant states, the United States has trained nine times more men than the Warsaw Pact countries."¹³

Delivery statistics are also quite revealing. The lapse time between contractual agreement and actual delivery is much shorter for the Soviet Union than it is for the

United States. The CIA estimates the average lapse time of the United States to be two to three times greater than the Soviet Union's (36 months vs. 12-18 months).¹⁴ Much of this Soviet capability may be due to its superior capacity to produce and deliver military hardware. Consider the following data:

Figure 3-2: Arms Deliveries to the Third World and % Share of Total (Millions of constant 1983 dollars)

	<u>United States</u>	<u>Soviet Union</u>
1976	8175 (38.7)	6063 (28.7)
1977	9756 (37.9)	8331 (32.2)
1978	10087 (32.1)	11011 (35.0)
1979	9222 (27.0)	15561 (45.6)
1980	6350 (21.1)	12167 (40.7)
1981	6825 (21.3)	9913 (30.9)
1982	7860 (23.9)	10357 (31.5)
1983	9684 (36.6)	7825 (29.6)
1984	4800	8600

Figure 3-3: Average Market Share of Major Suppliers' Arms Deliveries

	<u>United States</u>	<u>Soviet Union</u>
1963-1969	44	33
1970-1976	43	31
1977-1983	26	34

This information confirms earlier comments about the orientations of Presidents Carter and Reagan on arms sales. Additionally, Figures 3-2 and 3-3 indicate that although the US/USSR total share of arms market deliveries has fallen, the US has borne the brunt of this decline.

The delivery and constraints discussions above directly relate to the question of reliability. Owing to the constraints under which the American security assistance program operates, and its lesser capabilities to ship materiel, the US is often viewed as being an unreliable provider. A recent Washington Post article carried the following headline, "Cutbacks Force US To Slash Foreign Aid".¹⁷ These cutbacks caused MAP programs to be eliminated for 19 countries. The result is that the United States' security assistance program is sometimes perceived as being confused and undirected. In actuality, the United States follows a blueprint for security assistance which rests upon many of the same geopolitical precepts as that of the Soviet Union. The converse of the above holds true for the Soviet

Union. They enjoy a reputation of giving more aid to supported states on more favorable repayment terms; and whereas Western aid is often criticized for being unreliable and uncoordinated, many believe that Eastern Bloc aid does not suffer from these difficulties.¹⁸

NOTES

1. Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), The Management of Security Assistance, (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 1983), pp. 3-21 to 3-22.
2. Rajan Menon, "Soviet Arms Transfers to the Third World: Characteristics and Consequences," Journal of International Affairs, Summer 1986 (40), p. 59.
3. Menon, p. 68.
4. CENTO's membership was comprised of the United States, the United Kingdom, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan.
5. Menon, p. 68.
6. Noel Koch, "US Security Assistance to the Third World: Time for a Reappraisal," Journal of International Affairs, Summer 1986 (40), p. 43.
7. Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture FY 1988, 1987, p. 27.
8. DISAM, pp. 1-30 to 1-31.
9. Orah Cooper and Carol Fogarty, "Soviet Economic Aid to Less Developed Countries, 1954-78," in U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, "Soviet Economy in a Time of Change," Vol. 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Oct 1979, p. 654.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, (Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 9.

Menon, p. 62, used both of the above sources to arrive at the figures indicated.
10. Menon, p. 69.

11. Stephanie G. Neuman, Military Assistance in Recent Wars: The Dominance of the Superpowers, (Wash., D.C., Georgetown Univ., CSIS, 1986), p.31.

12. DISAM, p. 1-45.

13. Stephanie G. Neuman, "The Arms Trade in Recent Wars," Journal of International Affairs, Summer 1986 (40), p. 89.

14. Ibid, p. 85.

15. Richard F. Grimmet, "Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Suppliers, 1976-1983," Congressional Research Service, Report 84-82F, 7 May 1984, Table 2A, p. 23.

Menon, p. 63.

16. ACDA, 1985, p. 20.

17. "Cutbacks Force US to Slash Foreign Aid," The Washington Post, January 30, 1988, p. 1.

18. Nation and Kauppi, p. 138.

CHAPTER FOUR
GEOPOLITICS
OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION:
FOCUS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

- Part One: Global Interests of the United States and the Soviet Union
- Part Two: American and Soviet Interests in Sub-saharan Africa
- Part Three: Sub-saharan Africa in East-West Context

Part One: Global Interests of the United States and the Soviet Union

The United States

The breadth and depth of American involvement in foreign lands is staggering. Virtually all of these involvements are linked to one or more of the five roles that the United States senses it is required to play in the international system: anti-imperialist agent, defender of values, example, developer, and faithful ally.¹ By briefly examining each of these roles, it becomes possible to discern the basis for US interests in a given state or region of the world.

US opposition to expansionism during World War II signaled its formal assumption of duties as an anti-imperialist agent. Faced with attempts by the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union to ideologically reorganize the world, the United States structured a number of military alliances (ANZUS, NATO, SEATO, CENTO, and the Rio Pact) to contain the expansion of these powers. Concern for the physical and economic security of its own people and territory, as well as that of its allies, provided the United States with the motivation necessary to commit itself intensely to this role. Though the PRC is less of a threat now, states like Libya and Vietnam continue to keep the US ever vigilant in its performance of this role.

Interestingly, even when the United States acts as an anti-imperialist agent, the strong moralistic element which permeates all considerations of American foreign policy is present. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk placed these values in perspective when he remarked, "We have no quarrel with the communists, all of our quarrels are on behalf of other people."² Another former Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, identified these values thusly:

- * The right to be free from governmental violation of the integrity of person (torture, cruel/degrading/inhuman treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrest/imprisonment, denial of fair public trial, and invasion).
- * The right to fulfillment of vital needs (food, shelter, health care, education).
- * The right to enjoy civil and political liberties: freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech and press; freedom of movement within and outside one's country; and freedom to take part in government.³

President Wilson got America involved in World War I to "make the world safe for democracy", and President Kennedy vowed to "bear any burden, pay any price" to defend these values internationally. Countless other examples attest to the United States' resolve to defend these values. Admittedly, defense of these values has sometimes suffered when US security interests were involved.⁴

" In the long view, the surest way for the US to influence for the better the ideological future of mankind everywhere is by being sure that we present an unwavering example of commitment to our principles at home."⁵

" The US should, by example, or action, or both, exert influence toward the spread of more representative and responsive governments in the world."⁸

The words of Bayless Manning and William P. Bundy above demonstrate the "example" role referred to earlier. They are indicative of US attempts in the 1950s and 1960s to reshape the world in the American image: democracy, free-market economy, civil rights, and the like. Though the rise of nationalism, the rise of the non-aligned movement, and several other developments have mitigated against the US's performance of this role, it continues to be a factor in US involvements overseas.

If the role of example is waning, the opposite holds true for the role of developer. The United States has consistently shown an interest in assisting in the development of the world's lesser-developed states. Although much of this aid reflects American self-interests, much of it is extended based on a sense of altruism. The significant contributions that the United States makes to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development and similar organizations, highlights its commitment to this role.

Finally, the United States, as a matter of honor and credibility, strongly desires to be perceived as a faithful

ally. US support of its alliances and agreements is based upon this long-standing theme.

These roles form the basis for identifying US interests in sub-saharan Africa and elsewhere around the world. The Soviet Union could easily claim that it performs these roles also. Despite the existence of some possible similarities, the attitudes with which these states pursue these roles are markedly different. Primary among these attitudes is the Soviet rejection of the "capitalist" notion of peaceful, nonviolent evolutionary change in favor of revolution.

The Soviet Union

It is difficult to determine the exact nature of the global interests of the Soviet Union. At one end of the spectrum of analysis is the belief that the interests pursued globally by the Soviets are determined by a messianic plan to expand communism throughout the entire world. Driven by scientific socialism and dialectical materialism, the Soviets, this position asserts, maintain that revolutions are necessary because oppressors become ignorant of the failings of their economic ideology and will not change unless forced to do so. As a result, the Soviet Union has frequently supported wars of national liberation, and senses that it must offer decisive resistance to the

aggressive forces of capitalist-imperialism wherever required.'

At the other end of this spectrum of analysis is the belief that Soviet global interests are determined based upon a pragmatic assessment of the country's physical and economic security requirements. Hence, this view holds that any actions taken to enhance Soviet influence throughout the world are more a result of their desire for survival than an ideological obligation to "spread the faith".

The global interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are so vast that no one factor totally accounts for their presence in a given state or region. Part Two develops this notion as it regards sub-saharan Africa, and in so doing it relates sub-saharan Africa to its global context.

Part Two: American and Soviet Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa

American Interests

The interests that America has pursued in sub-saharan Africa were largely dependent on the character of the presidential administration of the time. There are, however, several common interests and policy themes which have been present throughout America's interaction with sub-saharan Africa. These administrations, interests and themes are examined below.

The United States virtually ignored sub-saharan Africa from 1945 to 1960. The Eisenhower administration seemed content to let Europe "handle it". No interest was shown in the nascent liberation movements of this realm, and there was a general air of indifference in regard to even highly significant developments such as the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Ironically, this condition of ignorance towards sub-saharan Africa was growing at a time when Africa and Asia were quickly becoming the foci of the Cold War.

President Kennedy's administration initiated a dramatic reversal to this mind-set. After establishing the non-governmental Advisory Council on African Affairs, he quickly undertook measures which ultimately evoked a sense of euphoria in sub-saharan Africa. The Peace Corps was established and economic aid was markedly increased from 139 million dollars in 1960 to 250 million dollars in 1961 and 1962.⁷ President Kennedy offered unselfish reasons to account for the character of US involvement in the region:

" We help not because the communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because its right."⁸

This justification closely relates to the altruistic developer role mentioned earlier. Obviously, other motivations may have been more decisive than those noted.

Interestingly, despite being viewed as anti-colonialists by the Africans, the United States often acted in favor of the colonial powers. For example, when faced with deciding between self-determination for the peoples of Portuguese colonial Africa, and use of the Portuguese Azores islands for military aircraft in 1962, the anti-imperialist agent role (military use of the Azores) won over the defender of values role (self-determination). Indeed, these same dynamics were at play when the administration voted against sanctions on the Republic of South Africa that same year.

The US Congress did not share President Kennedy's foreign aid priorities. Acrimony between the Executive and the Legislature over foreign aid policies led to the creation of the Clay Commission which rendered this finding in 1963:

" The United States should concentrate assistance in a few countries and foreign aid to Africa should be reduced since immediate security interests are less evident there than in countries adjacent to the Communist Bloc."⁹

President Johnson, who inherited this orientation, exhibited none of the warmth and personableness that had endeared Kennedy to the Africans. Congressional pressure required President Johnson to limit foreign aid to those states which were clearly identifiable as friends or allies of the United States. Consequently, aid to Africa plummeted

from 258.7 million dollars in 1963, to 201.5 million dollars in 1964, to 164.3 million dollars in 1965.¹⁰ Additionally, the process of replacing grant aid with cash and credit sales (mentioned in Chapter 3), was accelerated.

It should be mentioned that the Johnson administration was severely limited in its flexibility by the Vietnam War. So too was the Nixon administration. Economic and security interests of the United States dominated the Nixon African agenda. Despite a United Nations ban on purchasing chrome from Rhodesia, the Nixon administration oversaw the American circumvention of this ban; an act which was inimical to America's announced policy of support for self-determination of the Rhodesian peoples. The strategic importance of South Africa's minerals (to be discussed in Part Three) led to a policy of benign neglect of their apartheid system. It was during this administration that America took up the East-West dispute in Africa in earnest. The United States began surreptitious CIA-sponsored support of the pro-West FNLA insurgent group in Angola. The FNLA defeat proved to be the forerunner of several defeats the United States was to experience in sub-saharan Africa under Presidents Nixon and Ford.


Many African diplomats sense that there have been only two bright spots since World War II in African-American relations: the administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Carter. President Carter reintroduced an emphasis on human

rights in foreign policy which pleased the Africans. More importantly, he vigorously pursued Black majority rule for southern Africa. Substantial increases in economic aid combined with the aforementioned developments to create the mutual belief that African-American relations were finally properly focused. The conflict on the Horn of Africa in 1977, the loss of Iran in 1979, and the Soviet move into Afghanistan that same year changed everything. Geopolitical interpretations of the continent's challenges regained the ascendancy they had lost after the Nixon-Ford administrations. This is essentially where the United States stands today.

As indicated in Chapter Three, President Reagan's administration views sub-saharan Africa as one of the globe's battlegrounds for the East-West conflict:

" The [Reagan] administration would probably accept the burden of the charge that it tends to view African problems not in terms of their full implications for Africa but rather with respect to how they affect the United States in its global strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union or in terms of the flow of Middle East oil or assuring the security of Israel."¹¹

Figure 4-1: The Movement of Oil, 1981



Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 1982. London: The British Petroleum Company p.l.c., 1982, pp. 14-15.

African Defence Journal similarly states that:

" American strategy in Africa is essentially linked to the state of East-West relations, and to the larger context of the fundamental struggle between Marxism and capitalism. It is a conflict both of power and ideology."¹²

This view of Africa has caused the US to focus on the volatile region of southern Africa. As part of its policy to assist anti-communist "freedom fighters" around the world, the Reagan administration quickly tried to repeal the 1976 Clark Amendment which forbade American support of insurgents

insurgents in Angola. In addition to its interest in combating communism throughout Africa, the Reagan administration also seeks to: enhance regional security; strengthen threatened economies to stave off political instability, support efforts to enhance self-determination, and expand growth possibilities in Africa which will mutually benefit the states of Africa and the United States economy.¹³ So, outside the region of southern Africa, the US is, for the most part, providing assistance for nation and state-building projects. There is one notable exception. Libyan sponsorship of terrorism and its imperialistic moves into Chad have caused the administration to be predisposed to provide aid to virtually any state which resists Libyan hegemony or expansion.

Although it may be difficult to imagine, there do not appear to be any vital national interests at stake for the United States in sub-saharan Africa. Several strategic, economic, and political interests are very important to the United States, but none have been assessed to be worth fighting for.

American concern over its ability to protect the oil flow from the Persian Gulf oil states has given new strategic meaning to the Horn of Africa. Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti, at US urging, have each extended a number of important military rights to US air and naval forces. In return, the US provides each of these countries

with substantial amounts of economic and military aid (see Figure 4-5). The Cape route causes similar concerns for the United States. As Figure 4-1 clearly indicates, much of the world's oil, indeed, much of the world's trade, transits this route. It is worth noting here that like most strategic interests the US pursues in Africa, the motivation derives from factors external to the continent; namely, a desire to counter and weaken Soviet influence so it cannot threaten these interests.

Access to critical resources is another consistent interest of the United States.. Most of these resources are found in southern Africa as Figure 4-2 indicates:

Figure 4-2

Minerals and the Major Sub-Saharan Africa Producers
(% of World Total)

	RSA	Zai.	Zim.	Zam.	Gab.	Gui.	Bot.
Chromium							
P	34		6				
R	67		30				
Manganese							
P	23				12		
R	41						
Vanadium							
P	31						
R	42						
Platinum							
P	45						
R	81						
Antimony							
P	16						
R	7						
Titanium							
P	15						
R	5						
Cobalt							
P		51		13			5
R		38		12			
Copper							
P	5	6		8			
R		6		6			
Mercury							
P							15
R							8
Bauxite							
P						15	
R							
Uranium							
P	26 (includes Namibia's 10%)						
R	23 (" " 7%)						

(Figure 4-2 continued)

	RSA	Zai.	Zim.	Zam.	Gab.	Gui.	Bot.
Gold							
P	57						
R	51						
Diamonds (gems and industrial)							
P	20						
R	21						

Notes:

RSA= Republic of South Africa; Zai.= Zaire; Zim.= Zimbabwe;
Zam.= Zambia; Gab.= Gambia; Gui.= Guinea; Bot.= Botswana.

P= Production; R= Reserves.

Only 5% or greater is listed.

Sources:

Goode's World Atlas, Rand McNally & Co. (New York), 17th edition, 1986, pp. 41-47.

Strategic Atlas: A Comparative Geopolitics of the World's Powers, Gerard Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Rageau, Harper & Row, (New York), 2nd edition, 1985, pp. 176-177.

A number of these minerals are strategically important to the United States. For example, the US imports 99% of its cobalt from southern Africa. Chromium, however, is even more critical. The US imports 89% of this ore from southern Africa. Chromium, vanadium, antimony, and titanium are essential to the production of alloyed steels. Each of these metals are used extensively by the defense industry owing to their anti-corrosive properties, high-strength, and high temperature resistance. Jet engines, heavy industrial

machinery, and power plant turbines are a few types of equipment which rely on these metals. The United States buys 56% of its vanadium imports from South Africa; 44% of its antimony; 30% of its chromite ore; 27% of its gold; 33% of its platinum group requirements; and 10 % of its manganese (essential to the production of steel).¹⁴ The only other substantial reserves of these minerals are found in the USSR and the Peoples Republic of China. Of all the US's interests in Africa, this is normally assessed as the most important.

Other than the minerals listed above, the United States does not possess a significant economic stake in sub-saharan Africa. Less than 1% of the United States' total import-export trade is conducted with sub-saharan African countries. Much of this percentage derives from US oil imports from Nigeria and Gabon. Despite this low volume of trade, the United States has adopted a policy of supporting nations with liberal economies in sub-saharan Africa. This is done to demonstrate the superiority of capitalism over socialism in fighting underdevelopment.¹⁵

Finally, political and moral interests exist for the United States in sub-saharan Africa. Politically, the African states comprise approximately one-third of the voting power of the United Nations, and frequently vote as a bloc. Hence, the US must respect them as a political power. Additionally, the problems associated with African poverty,

famine, disease, and underdevelopment in general, automatically engender America's moral interest; this harkens back to the notion of the US sensing that it has a moral responsibility to help those who are less fortunate.

It is instructive to note that US involvement in sub-saharan Africa has tended to operate within five broad themes.

First, the United States has virtually always viewed its efforts in sub-saharan Africa as supplementary to Europe's aid. The US Defense Department's Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year (FY) 1988 explicitly confirms this notion of burdensharing:

" To avoid duplication of effort and to build on the extensive experience of other countries outside the region, we are working closely with friends and allies, including the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Italy, in carrying out security assistance and other programs in Africa."¹⁶

Furthermore, the Clay Commission formalized this notion as early as 1963. A result of the American willingness to defer to the Europeans is a sensing that it is not essential to match the Soviet Union dollar for dollar in military assistance. Since 1950, five-sixths of America's security assistance has been economic, and one-sixth has been military-90% of which has come from MAP grants.¹⁷ The FY

1983 Africa Assistance budget is fairly representative of this theme:¹⁸

Figure 4-3: FY 1983 Africa Assistance

Development Assistance:	324 million dollars
Economic Support Funds:	325 million dollars
PL 480-2:	117 million dollars
PL 480-11:	75 million dollars
Foreign Military Sales:	234 million dollars
International Military Education and Training:	<u>9 million dollars</u>
Total:	1,084 million dollars


(Note: PL 480 is a food aid authority.)

A second theme is the US aversion to significant, direct involvement in sub-saharan African affairs. This tendency is related to the "supplementary" theme above. The United States appears to sense that Europe is primarily responsible for their former African colonies with whom they have had more interaction and experience than has the United States. So, in an effort to keep risks, costs, and responsibilities to a minimum, the US has avoided long term commitments in the form of long term treaties, alliances, or forward deployment of combat soldiers.

As a result of the first two themes, a third theme has emerged: compared to the other regions of the world

all the economic aid given out by the US.¹⁷ From 1950-1972 Africa received the lowest amount of any region in the world, totaling only 1% of all US aid given.²⁰ Recent budgets have continued this trend:

Figure 4-4: FY 1987 US Security Assistance Administration Proposal ²¹



Fourthly, US relations with sub-saharan African countries have normally been most strongly influenced by events outside of Africa, namely the Cold War, the East-West conflict, and the like. On the balance, this has caused the US to be highly reactive to communist initiatives, and therefore always seems to be trying to catch up.

Finally, America's attention to the states of sub-saharan Africa is highly selective, and often narrowly focused. From 1950-1972, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Zaire, Liberia,

Finally, America's attention to the states of sub-saharan Africa is highly selective, and often narrowly focused. From 1950-1972, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Zaire, Liberia, Mali, and Ghana received disproportionate amounts of US aid owing to America's economic, strategic and ideological concerns.²² Currently, the concerns are the same, but the states of East Africa (*) are now the focus:

Figure 4-5: FY 1988 Security Assistance Programs Budget Authority (Dollars in Thousands) ²³

	<u>Economic Support</u>	<u>FMS Financing Concess.</u>	<u>MAP Grants</u>	<u>IMET Grants</u>	<u>PKO</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Africa Civic Action/ Health			6000			6000
Benin				75		75
Botswana			5000	335		5335
Burkina Faso				50		50
Burundi				140		140
Cameroon		2500		250		2750
Cape Verde				50		50
Central African Republic			1000	125		1125
Chad	5000		9000	200		14200
Comoros				40		40
Congo				40		40
*Djibouti	3000		2000	135		5135

Eq. Guinea	1000	75	1075
Gabon	2500	150	2650
Gambia		60	60

(Figure 4-5 continued)

	<u>Economic Support</u>	<u>FMS Financing Concess.</u>	<u>MAP Grants</u>	<u>IMET Grants</u>	<u>PKO</u>	<u>Total</u>
Ghana				225		225
Guinea			3000	150		3150
Guinea-Bissau				30		30
Ivory Coast				150		150
*Kenya	17000		19000	1600		37600
Lesotho				50		50
Liberia	17000		3000	900		20900
Madagascar			1000	75		1075
Malawi			1000	200		1200
Mali				150		150
Mauritania				75		75
Niger			3000	250		3250
Nigeria				100		100
Rwanda				75		75
Senegal	14000		2000	475		16475
Seychelles	3000			35		3035
*Somalia	23000		22000	1250		46250
*Sudan	18000		10000	1000		29000
Swaziland				50		50

*Tanzania	35	35
Togo	60	60
*Uganda	100	100

(Figure 4-5 continued)

	<u>Economic Support</u>	<u>FMS Financing Concess.</u>	<u>MAP Grants</u>	<u>IMET Grants</u>	<u>PKO</u>	<u>Total</u>
Zaire			10000	1300		11300
Zimbabwe				175		175
Total	100000	5000	98000	10235	-	213235

Soviet Interests

The history of the Soviet Union's involvement in Africa began in a manner quite similar to that of the United States. CPSU leaders Lenin and Stalin both viewed Africa as an area of little importance. Krushchev dramatically reversed this outlook. Though the Soviet Union was to be a newcomer to Africa, Mr. Krushchev was highly optimistic. He sensed that the soon-to-be independent states of Africa could provide fertile ground for the spread of communist ideology and Soviet influence. Accordingly, the USSR announced in 1957 that they would support wars of national liberation, many of which were in their nascent stages in Africa. Late in 1958, Sekou Toure's Guinea became their

first foothold when the USSR supplied it with armor, infantry, and air defense weapons. In 1959, the Institute of African Studies was formed in Moscow to establish a base of knowledge for Soviet policy makers on Africa. In actuality, however, the Soviet Africa policy was to be formulated without the benefit of any substantial scholarly research.

As a consequence, from 1958 until Krushchev's ouster in 1964, the Soviet's extended military aid to virtually each state which requested it. This aid was viewed as a political instrument which could "properly" influence its recipients. Somalia benefited greatly from this orientation. In 1963 they concluded a 35 million dollar arms agreement with the Soviet Union for supersonic aircraft, tanks, and other military equipment.²⁴ At the time, it was by far the largest military aid package ever extended to an African country. Remarkably, this agreement followed the embarrassing failure of Soviet efforts to support Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba (the Congo) during the 1960 Katanga Province rebellion. These developments were indicative of what might be categorized as the experimental period of Soviet involvement in Africa. Much was observed and learned, and many adjustments were made during subsequent Soviet administrations.

CPSU leader Leonid Brezhnev strongly pursued Krushchev's initiatives, and through a series of

opportunistic dealings, managed to extend Soviet influence into several regions of Africa. He did , however, make some changes in the manner in which the Soviet policy was executed. The Brezhnev administration was much more selective in extending Soviet military aid. Additionally, Soviet military assistance, though markedly still more plentiful than Western aid, decreased slightly as economic aid and diplomacy began to play greater roles. Furthermore, it became clear that the Soviets were beginning to focus on those regions which were deemed (probably by the Africa Institute) to be useful strategically; that is, those regions which would add to the Soviet Union's developing potential to project power globally.

Coincidentally, towards the end of Brezhnev's rule, the US began to contest the Soviets in Africa and elsewhere. This may be one of the reasons that CPSU leader Gorbachev announced in his book entitled Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World that the USSR would no longer automatically support wars of national liberation.²⁵ This announcement seemed to be based upon the growing frustration and pessimism the Soviets hold in regard to the potential for spreading the Marxist-Leninist ideology in Africa.

Since entering the continent in the 1950s, the Soviet Union has pursued a variety of ideological, geopolitical, and economic interests. Each of these interests seems to

play a part in explaining Soviet involvement in sub-saharan Africa even today.

Soviet rhetoric continues to praise any action taken to further the worldwide struggle against capitalism and imperialism. To a limited extent, this is still one of their interests in sub-Saharan Africa. Former USSR President Podgorny once remarked upon this ideological perspective of Soviet involvement:

" As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, its policy in Africa is extremely clear. We want the African peoples to be totally free from colonialism and we do not want a single region or territory where colonialism, racism, or apartheid rules to remain on the African continent. The rendering of aid and support in every possible way to peoples who have freed themselves from colonial dependence is an integral part of Soviet foreign policy."²⁶

The ideological aspect of Soviet motivations for being involved in sub-saharan Africa is often obscured by the tactical flexibility used to obtain strategic objectives. Hence, there is often difficulty in discerning whether a Soviet initiative is ipso facto an end, or merely a means to fulfill this ultimate ideological objective.

A desire to gain geopolitical advantages over the West seems to be the focal point of another aspect of Soviet interests in Africa. The primary tool used to achieve this end has been arms sales:

Figure 4-6: Soviet Arms Deliveries to Sub-Saharan African States, Cumulative 1981-1985 (Millions of Dollars)

Recipient	Value of Total Arms Delivered by All Suppliers	Value of Soviet Arms Deliveries
Angola	2975	2800
Benin	85	50
Botswana	15	10
Burkina Faso	40	0
Burundi	50	30
Cameroon	245	10
Cape Verde	30	30
Central African Rep.	10	0
Chad	85	0
Congo	190	180
Equatorial Guinea	40	0
Ethiopia	2100	2000
Gabon	200	0
Gambia, The	0	0
Ghana	30	5
Guinea	25	20

(Figure 4-6 continued)

Recipient	Value of Total Arms Delivered by All Suppliers	Value of Soviet Arms Deliveries
Guinea-Bissau	60	60
Ivory Coast	170	0
Kenya	300	0
Lesotho	5	0
Liberia	30	0
Malawi	5	0
Mali	65	60
Mauritania	45	0
Mozambique	825	775
Niger	20	0

(Figure 4-6 continued)

Recipient	Value of Total Arms Delivered by All Suppliers	Value of Soviet Arms Deliveries
Nigeria	1820	80
Rwanda	5	0
Sao Tome and Principe	0	0
Senegal	30	0
Sierra Leone	5	0
Somalia	365	0
South Africa	25	0
Sudan	560	0
Swaziland	0	0
Tanzania	140	70
Togo	50	0
Uganda	135	0
Zaire	150	0
Zambia	75	10
Zimbabwe	255	5

Source

R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi, The Soviet Impact in Africa, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1984), pp. 132-133.

In the 1960s and 1970s this desire also extended to the Peoples Republic of China. To many it appears that the

Soviets have been attempting to obtain a grouping of pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist states in sub-saharan Africa which will allow them to block the expansion of Western influence on the sub-continent. For example, Soviet interest in southern Africa may be motivated, in part, by a desire to deny the West access to essential minerals located there. Power projection is a related corollary. Here it seems that the USSR is most interested in those states which will help them project power by air (airbases) and sea (ports). The Soviets may also be interested in those territories where they can establish arms depots. These depots, airbases, and ports could be used to deter the "imperialistic" West or spread the revolution overseas from Africa. A final aspect of these geopolitical interests is that like the US, the Soviet Union may be motivated by the voting power of the African states in international fora. The Soviets have frequently benefited from African bloc voting in the United Nations, and continue to actively nurture the role of counselor to enhance attainment of the interests mentioned above.

Economic interests reside in many forms. Africa is a source of raw materials, food, and most importantly, hard currency for the Soviet Union. However, as will be seen in the following discussion of recurring themes, the "economic motivater" is markedly less significant than the ideological and geopolitical interests of the USSR in Africa.

Three broad themes recur in the USSR-Africa relationship. First, is the perpetual battle that communism is forced to wage against African nationalism. African nationalism has come in many forms: Pan Africanism (W.E.B. Dubois of U.S.A.), African Personality (Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana), Negritude (Leopold Senghor of Senegal), Authenticity (Mobutu of Zaire), and African Socialism (an economic mind-set) are a few examples. There has been a firm reluctance of African leaders to subordinate their "African-ness" to the rigidities of communist dogma. Indeed, in 1964, the Soviet Union's preeminent Africanists, Ivan Potekhin of the Africa Institute and Vladimir Kudryavtsev, a journalist for Izvestia, characterized these notions as "anti-scientific", "revisionist", and anathematic to Marxism.²⁶ In many cases, the Soviets have seized upon the "progressive" rhetoric of African leaders only to find that "they did not get what they paid for". The list of such setbacks is illuminating: Ghana, Guinea, Congo, Mali, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Nigeria, and Sudan. The absence of a proletariat for the party to lead, and the severe cultural asymmetries between Russian and African, have combined with African nationalism to set the following principle: that aid to an African state does not automatically equate to influence.

A second theme is the Soviet overwhelming reliance on military aid for influence to the near total exclusion of all other tools of influence. As discussed in Chapter

Three, the ratio of military to economic aid is approximately ten to one. For example, in 1981, Soviet military sales to sub-Saharan African countries was 1.9 billion dollars. By contrast, economic aid was a mere 125 million dollars.²⁸

Finally, it seems that the Soviets have determined that Marxism in Africa is best preserved by the physical presence of Marxist soldiers and advisers. This accounts for the large number of Soviet proxy troops in Africa (Cuban, East German, Czech, etc.). As in the case of the United States, this allows the Soviets to minimize their direct involvement with combat soldiers in the states of Africa.

Part Three: Sub-Saharan Africa in East-West Context

A series of charts, maps and brief comments will help place the information in Parts One and Two in perspective.

First, it can be concluded that in regards to the regional distribution of assistance, the Soviet Union treats sub-saharan Africa with more importance than does the United States (Figure 4-7). Consequently, the military assistance deliveries to sub-saharan Africa by the USSR far surpass those of the US (Figure 4-8).

In terms of commitment, the Soviet Union has shown a willingness to enter into long term treaties of "cooperation and friendship" which have no US parallel. Figures 4-9 and


4-10 graphically portray the US's disadvantaged position in this area. In this regard, Figure 4-11 brings Africa into focus and further illustrates this point.

These results could have been predicted given the aims of the two players: the USSR purportedly pursues an ideological revolution, while the United States seeks stability. Hence, the Soviets are predisposed to spend more on military aid than the US. Interestingly, both states are newcomers to the continent, both states rely on bilateral agreements in Africa, and the interests of both states rest on a combination of ideological and pragmatic (economic, geostrategic) precepts. Chapters Five through Seven will reveal the tactics of each approach.

Figure 4-7: Regional Distribution of Soviet and US Arms Deliveries 1979-1983 (% of Total Dollar Value)²⁹


	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Middle East/North Africa	37	52
East Asia	20	12
South Asia	17	9
Western Europe	33	0
Eastern Europe	0	12
Sub-Saharan Africa	1	9
Latin America	2	6
Oceania	3	0
North America	4	0

Figure 4-8: US and Soviet Military Assistance Deliveries to Countries in Central, Southern, and West Africa, 1981-1986 (Millions of Dollars)



Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture FY 1988, 1987, p. 30.

Figure 4-9: U.S Security Treaties 1986



Notes


As of 11 August 1986, the U.S. suspended its ANZUS Treaty security obligation to New Zealand. Hence, the US no longer maintains a military relationship with New Zealand in ANZUS.

Additionally, not reflected here are formal defense "arrangements" the US has with Morocco, Zaire, Kenya, Liberia, and Somalia.

Source


Adapted from John M. Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980, p.189.

Figure 4-10 Soviet Security Treaties 1986



Source: Adapted from Collins, p. 181.

Figure 4-11: US-USSR Security Commitments in Africa



Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture FY 1988, p.25.

NOTES

1. Other roles include regional leader, world capital, and global preserver.
2. Monteagle Stearns, "Making American Diplomacy Relevant," Foreign Affairs, 52(1) (October, 1973), p. 156.
3. Sandra Vogelgesand, "What Price Principle? US Policy on Human Rights," Foreign Affairs, 56(4) (July, 1978), p. 821.
4. The United States has supported dictators in deference to US security interests: Marcos of the Philippines, Somoza of Nicaragua, and Mobutu of Zaire are several examples.
5. Bayless Manning, "Goals, Ideology, and Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, 54(2) (January, 1976), p. 275.
6. William P. Bundy, "Dictatorships and American Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, 54(1) (October, 1975), P. 54.
7. Mohamed A. El-Khawas, "US Foreign Policy Toward Africa, 1960-1972," Current Bibliography on African Affairs, (July, 1972), p. 408.
8. Ibid.
9. El-Khawas, p. 409.
10. El-Khawas, p. 412.
11. Gus J. Liebenow, "American Policy in Africa, the Reagan Years," Current History, (March , 1983), p. 99.
12. "American Strategy in Africa: Bilateral, Selective Cooperation," African Defence Journal, (February, 1985), p. 38.

13. "American Security Assistance to Africa in FY 1983," African Defence Journal, (August, 1982), p. 50.
14. Kenneth L. Adelman, African Realities, (New York: Crane, Russak, & Co., 1980), p. 22.
15. "American Strategy in Africa: Bilateral, Selective Cooperation," African Defence Journal, (February, 1985), p. 38.
16. Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress, (Wash., D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1987), p. 217.
17. Fiscal Year Series (Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency, September 30, 1986), pp. 208-209.
18. "American Security Assistance to Africa in FY 1983," African Defence Journal, (August, 1982), p. 49.
19. El-Khawas, p. 53.
20. Fiscal Year Series, PP. 2-3; 208-209.
21. Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture FY 1988, (1987), p.32.
22. Fiscal Year Series, pp. 208-209.
23. United States of America Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs Fiscal Year 1988, p. 7.
24. R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi, The Soviet Impact in Africa, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1984), p. 126.
25. Daniel N. Nelson, "Uneasy Days for the Soviets", The Kansas City Star, December 6, 1987, p. 6K.
26. David Hamilton, "Ethiopia's Embattled Revolutionaries," Conflict Studies (82), (April, 1977), p. 11.

27. Charles B. McLane, Soviet-African Relations, (London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1974), pp. 8-9.

28. "Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World, 1981," U.S. Department of State, February, 1983, p. 12.

29. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985, pp. 131-134..

CHAPTER FIVE

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Part One: Effectiveness of the United States

Part Two: Effectiveness of the Soviet Union

Part One: Effectiveness of the United States

Having already identified the global interests and responsibilities of the United States in Chapter Four, the following discussion of the regional objectives of the United States in southern Africa will allow for conduct of the effectiveness appraisal described in Chapter One.

The United States has "traditionally" pursued four main objectives in southern Africa. The first of these is the US desire to reduce the influence of the Soviet Union in the region. This goal is far from realisation. The Soviets have footholds in Angola and Mozambique, and have a measure of influence with Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Recently, Dimitri Simes, a respected American journalist, in an article entitled "Pretoria's 'Little Flirtation' with Moscow", added another unlikely member to this list. While clearly emphasizing the staunch anti-communist disposition of the South African government, Simes highlighted the growing resentment within South Africa for the sanctions and other acts of condemnation forced upon the state by the US.¹ He continues by explaining how this Pretoria-Moscow rapprochement is the logical resultant of South African frustrations.

Events on the sub-continent in the mid-1970s presented the United States with its greatest challenges to this goal. Alerted by Soviet success in Mozambique in 1974, the United

States decided to "draw the line" in Angola. By dramatically increasing its military aid to the pro-Western Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) in September of 1975, the US hoped to counter Soviet support of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The US's hurried effort proved to be no match for the Soviet program; consequently, the MPLA won control of Angola. The West repulsed Soviet-backed insurgents in the Shaba I (1977) and Shaba II (May 1978) invasions, but the US played only a minor role in each. President Carter, in declaring that the United States would not become involved in any foreign conflict simply because the Russians were there, summed up the US's modified view of containment at the time.² The Reagan administration has attempted to reduce Soviet influence in the region more vigorously than any of its predecessors. It has supported the pro-Western insurgency in Angola, the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), with arms and military equipment. The Reagan policy, according to a recent Associated Press article, may also have increased the likelihood that the 40,000 Cuban troops stationed in Angola (Soviet surrogates) will be withdrawn.³ Additionally, Mozambique's move away from Moscow and towards the West in the Fall of 1985 can certainly be counted as a success. On the balance, however, the United States has been only marginally successful in reducing Soviet influence in southern Africa. This does not mean

that Soviet influence is not waning; it is waning, but the reasons for this will be discussed in Part Two.

The second major objective pursued by the United States in southern Africa is the flip-side of the first: to increase US influence in the region. Increased influence carries many benefits: potential enhancement of US geostrategic capabilities in vicinity of the important Cape sea route and additional markets for US exports are two of many benefits. As it has elsewhere, the United States has relied on political/diplomatic, and economic means to accomplish this objective. The major reason why the United States has been unsuccessful in its bid to "win friends" in the region is the fundamental difference in the priorities of the states involved. Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (the "front-line" states) all pursue the establishment of Black majority rule in the Republic of South Africa as their top foreign policy goal. They have grown to distrust the United States in this endeavor as the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Reagan administrations have all, through their actions or inaction, failed to embrace this goal with a vigor which matched their rhetoric. Indeed, only President Carter, the first serving US President to visit Africa, executed a southern Africa policy which earned the credibility of the leaders of the front-line states. In general, the classic confrontation between America's moral responsibilities (the

defender of values role mentioned in Chapter Four) and its security needs (South Africa's strategic minerals and strategic position) has forced the United States to pursue goals which frequently seem to be mutually exclusive. Additionally, as Figure 5-1 below indicates, only Zaire, Botswana, and Malawi have received "major funding" from US security assistance programs. Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe received very limited assistance for training programs.

Figure 5-1: US Security Assistance to the States of Southern Africa 1950-1988 (Dollars in Thousands)

	<u>50-79</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>88</u>
Angola	(No aid programs from 1950 to 1988)									
Botswana										
IMET	0	70	22	95	193	225	283	334	*	335
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	2000	4000	3650	*	5000
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	0	9105	3871	5000	5000
Lesotho	(No aid programs from 1950 to 1988)									
Malawi										
IMET	0	18	21	67	148	184	193	187	*	200
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	1500	957	*	1000
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	0	63	459	0	0
Mozambique	(No aid programs from 1950 to 1988)									
RSA										
IMET	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FMS	3149	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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AMERICAN AND SOVIET SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA: AN EFFECTIVENESS APPRAISAL(U) ARMY COMMAND AND
GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS M L SMITH


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
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(Figure 5-1 continued)

	50-79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
Swaz.										
IMET	0	0	0	0	0	50	50	42	0	0
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tanzania	(No aid programs from 1950 to 1988)									
Zaire										
IMET	9373	743	747	202	517	710	1284	1255	*	1300
MAP	23308	0	0	3000	4500	7000	7000	8699	*	10000
FMS	63542	8134	6878	6073	8137	15718	12888	7612	5000	5000
Zambia	(No aid programs from 1950 to 1988)									
Zimbabwe										
IMET	0	0	0	60	110	147	201	191	*	0
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Notes

1. IMET: International Military Education and Training Program; MAP: Military Assistance Program; FMS: Foreign Military Sales Program. See Chapter Three for further explanation.
2. * symbol indicates that data were not available.
3. Commercial exports deliveries data were not included.
4. The noticeable rise in funding from 1985 on is mostly due to the Civic Action Program for Africa (CAPA). It is a program designed to enhance the capabilities of African militaries in a way which contributes to the economic (focus on the infrastructure) and social (health care, education, etc.) development of their countries.
5. 1988 data is proposed amount.

Sources

Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 1988.

Fiscal Year Series (as of September 1986), Defense Security Assistance Agency, 1986.

The third major objective pursued by the US in southern Africa is the preservation of free access to the strategically important mineral resources it receives from the region. The following citations place this interest in perspective:

" Core industrial nations increasingly need the developing countries as sources of raw materials, as export markets, and most important of all, as constructive partners in the creation of a workable order."

(Trilateral Commission, U.S.A)⁴

" Trade in raw materials...is the epicenter of the crisis shocks, and the weakest link in the system of capitalist international economic relations."

(D. Kostiukhin, Kommunist)⁵

These comments summarize both the needs and threats to these needs faced by the United States in southern Africa.

Chapter Four related the criticality of these raw materials.

If the Soviet Union is indeed pursuing a strategy which would ultimately allow them to deny the US/West access to these minerals, then the US has cause for concern. For its part, the United States has, as mentioned above, frequently appeared to be acting with duplicity owing to the conflict inherent in pursuing moral and security objectives in the same state (formerly in Rhodesia, and now most notably in the Republic of South Africa). As a result, its access to these materials is always in jeopardy.

The fourth major objective pursued by the United States in the region is the political and economic development of friendly countries. In so doing, however, the US desperately wants to avoid any quick, fundamental political/economic restructuring ; it wants stability. The US has always spoken out in favor of majority rule and multiracial, representative democracy, but has frequently executed actions which were inimical to these objectives. For example, despite public denouncements of South Africa's apartheid system, the Nixon and Ford administrations oversaw a doubling of US investment in South Africa (from 778 million dollars in 1970 to 1.57 billion dollars in 1975); and similar rates of increase in US exports to South Africa (288 million dollars in 1970 to 1.27 billion dollars in 1977); and US imports from South Africa (568 million dollars in 1970 to 1.54 billion dollars in 1977).⁶ Furthermore,

- " While the US arms embargo against the Republic of South Africa was kept on the books, the Nixon and Ford administrations liberalized the treatment of equipment which could serve either military or civilian purposes (light aircraft, C-130s, helicopters, communications equipment, jeeps, and trucks)."⁷

The passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, over President Reagan's veto, at first seemed to be a necessary tool for forcing change in South Africa. To the contrary, the March 1988 election results in South Africa reveal an even greater degree of intransigence on the part

of conservative South Africans. Economically, the story is much the same. Despite the existence of several commendable economic programs: the African Economic Policy Reform Program, the Baker Plan for Assistance on Debt, Food for Progress, and the President's Initiative to End Hunger in Africa, proportionately little of each goes to the states of southern Africa. The program for regional trade and transport development of southern African states is a clear exception to this pattern. This program promises to substantially assist many southern African states in their attempts to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa.

Zaire has occupied a special position in U.S. efforts to fulfill the four objectives mentioned above. First, it is geographically important. Its large size and position in the center of the continent make it a natural base from which to extend American influence. Additionally, it is an area endowed with important minerals like cobalt (world's leading producer), copper, tin, zinc, and industrial diamonds. Secondly, America's most compelling interest in Zaire has not been its geographic position or its mineral bonanza, it has been Zaire's President- Mobutu Sese Seko. Marshall Mobutu has ruled the country since 1965. Since that time he has earned a reputation as a staunch anti-communist. This orientation and Zaire's military actions on

behalf of the United States, have made Mobutu America's most reliable ally in all of southern Africa.

Mobutu's allegiance has not been free, however. A number of previously secret disclosures have revealed that America's Central Intelligence Agency paid Mobutu hundreds of thousands of dollars for his "services".⁸ Furthermore, Mobutu's ownership of several European chateaus and his lavish personal expenditures are indicative of the "fief" mentality with which he runs the country. The costs to America have been more than financial, however. Mobutu's human rights practices have been frequently criticized, in the harshest terms, by a wide variety of human rights watch groups. The United States has repeatedly acknowledged Mobutu's deficiencies in this area and has no doubt appealed for improvements. Nevertheless, these concerns have usually placed a distant second to America's other interests in Zaire.

Appraisal of the US

Regarding factors one and two of the effectiveness appraisal criteria (see Chapter One), it can now be concluded that the United States' security assistance programs in this region, from post-World War II to the present, have been only moderately successful in contributing to America's regional and global objectives. Of the four regional objectives analyzed, the preservation of access to strategic minerals objective stands as the only

clear success. Of the five global roles identified in Chapter Four (anti-imperialist agent, defender of values, example, developer, and faithful ally) which form the basis for US interests in a given state or region in the world, none, with the possible exception of the use of Zairean assets to contain Quadaffi's imperialism, have been effectively prosecuted.

Much of the same holds true for factor three concerning the strength of the interaction between the United States and the countries it assists. Figure 5-1 is quite revealing on this matter. Only three states, Botswana, Malawi, and Zaire have established any semblance of a long term relationship with the United States. Of these three, only Zaire can boast of a long term commitment from the United States. The US has no long or short term treaties with southern African countries, nor does it have guaranteed access to air or bases, overflight rights, refueling arrangements, or agreements for usage of facilities for military purposes (see Chapter 8, Figure 8-1).

Finally, from the point of view of the assisted state, outcomes met expectations. Those states designated for aid received it. Each of the three states receiving major assistance from the US, Botswana, Malawi, and Zaire, have seen their border security operations improve, their militaries have become more professional through IMET, and

their economic infrastructures have also been developed by American security assistance.

Considering these four criteria, it is safe to conclude that the United States' security assistance programs in southern Africa have been only marginally effective over the past four decades. The Soviet Union's record is quite different.

Part Two: Effectiveness of the Soviet Union

Since its arrival in sub-saharan Africa almost three decades ago, the Soviet Union has pursued four main objectives. The first of these was (is?) their desire or obligation to spread the Marxist-Leninist ideology throughout the region as part of their global effort to do the same:

" In the final analysis, the appearance and consolidation of the countries of socialist orientation on the African continent, and the revolutionary changes taking place there is a result of the further deepening of the general crisis of capitalism and the growth of world socialism."⁹

(V. Solodovnikov, Moscow, 1975)

Initially, this effort worked. As early as 1960, the Soviet Union began classifying the states of Africa as "progressive" or "reactionary". In this regard, pre-OAU (Organization of African Unity) groupings provided the

Soviets with a ready-made framework for analysis.¹⁰ The Casablanca Group (see Figure 5-2 below) received consistent praise from the Soviet Union. The Brazzaville and Entente Groups were consistently severely denounced. The non-Brazzaville members of the Monrovia Group were regarded as neutral.

Figure 5-2: Pre-OAU Groupings of Africa's States

<u>Casablanca</u> <u>(Jan. 1961)</u>	<u>Brazzaville</u> <u>(Dec. 1960)</u>	<u>Entente</u> <u>(Apr. 1959)</u>	<u>Monrovia</u> <u>(May 1961)</u>
Ghana	Mauritania	Ivory Coast	Mauritania
Guinea	Niger	Upper Volta	Niger
Mali	Chad	Niger	Chad
U.A.R.	Senegal	Dahomey	Senegal
Libya	Ivory Coast		Ivory Coast
Morocco	Upper Volta		Upper Volta
Algeria	Dahomey		Dahomey
	Congo-Braz.		Congo-Braz.
	Congo-Kin.		Congo-Kin.
	Cameroon		Cameroon
	C.A.R.		C.A.R.
	Gabon		Gabon
			Liberia
			Nigeria
			Somalia
			Sierra Leone
			Togo
			Ethiopia
			Libya
			Tunisia
			(Observer)

By the mid-1970s the Soviet Union could be credited with two large successes in southern Africa: Angola and Mozambique. Though Marxism-Leninism was a very strange concept to the inhabitants of each of these countries, by 1976, each was

being ruled by a "revolutionary democratic" party which was enroute to becoming a Marxist-Leninist party. Indeed, by 1977, the Soviet Union recognized the ruling parties of Angola and Mozambique as Marxist-Leninist parties. The comments of FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) leader Samora Machel underscore the breadth of this development:

" The hard class battles demand that the working class and the progressive elements from other workers' classes, have a vanguard party directed by the scientific ideology of the proletariat. The setting up of the party arises as a need of the development of the revolution." ¹¹

" Our struggle is to destroy all vestiges of feudalism and colonialism. But it is also fundamentally to crush capitalism, which is the most advanced form of exploitation of man by man. ¹²

Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe also embraced this rhetoric at one time or another. Currently, the revolutionary fervor inherent in these statements has, with possibly two exceptions, long since left southern Africa. Angola and, to a lesser extent, Mozambique are still classified as Marxist-Leninist states. Mozambique has repeatedly voiced its disappointment with Soviet economic assistance, and this, among other developments, has caused it to turn to the West. Chapter Four identified other reasons for the decline of socialism in southern Africa:

cultural asymmetries between Russians and Africans and African nationalism. The gains the Soviets made in this region in past decades are unlikely to be replicated in the future. Indeed, the tenets of socialism, as they are practiced in southern Africa, may fall prey to the same forces which have caused a decline in socialism throughout the world.

The second major objective pursued by the Soviets in southern Africa is to reduce American and Chinese influence in the region by raising their own. Interestingly, many analysts sense that the Soviet Union became involved in southern Africa primarily to contain Chinese gains there. By 1967, the Chinese, who were less dogmatic and less directive than the Soviets, had achieved considerable influence with the African leaders of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zaire. Additionally, they had gained the respect of the leaders of several insurgent groups including: FRELIMO, SWAPO (South-west Africa People's Organization), and ZANU (Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union). Noted Africanist Colin Legum comments on this rivalry:

" The clearest evidence of the primary importance of the Sino-Soviet contest was provided by the propaganda circulated in the Third World by Moscow and Peking during the Angolan crisis. Both sides were concerned almost entirely with discrediting each other and only to a minor degree with attacking 'U.S. and Western imperialism'." ¹³

Dr. Charles B. McLane, a scholar on Soviet-Third World relations is even more explicit:

"...the two socialist powers appealed, after all, to the same constituencies in Africa and competed for the same broad goals. An aid program launched by one power in a given African nation would often stimulate an offer of credit by the other; a setback experienced by one would frequently be followed by the other's prompt demarche to consolidate a temporary advantage." 14

The departure of China from the sub-continent has allowed the Soviet Union to focus on preventing the United States from gaining additional influence in the region. They attempt to accomplish this using political, military and economic means. Politically, they persistently point out the duplicity of America's policy regarding majority rule. This has proven to be very effective and because they seem to offer a more moral alternative, they have gained much influence with this position. The Soviets have also been willing to offer extensive training to political cadres. This, along with the ready-to-implement state ideology they offer, has appealed to the post-colonial leadership of southern Africa who were looking for technical assistance, and an "appropriate" development model.

Militarily, as was explained in Part One of this chapter, the Soviets out-maneuvered the US in Angola - an area where East/West competition was quite intense. Indeed, military aid continues to be a strength for the Soviet

Union. From January 1984 to January 1986, they spent one billion dollars for arms and defense materiel for Angola.¹⁵

Economically, however, they have been less successful. Angola and Mozambique have the worst economies in southern Africa and other socialist experiments like Tanzania's Ujamaa (agricultural collectivization) have failed miserably. Each of these countries has reason to be dissatisfied: Mozambique was refused entry into the Eastern bloc's economic community-COMECON; both countries complained about the paucity of Soviet economic aid; and both countries complained about Soviet violations of their May 1976 Trade and Fishing Agreements. Despair abounds as there is no successful socialist model of development in southern Africa, or for that matter in the whole of Africa. Furthermore, the leaders of southern Africa's states must certainly be aware of the difficulties that the Soviets are having with managing their own economy. This may ultimately lead to significant involuntary reductions in the Soviet Union's presence in the region. It has become evident that Angola and Mozambique, while maintaining their ties with the Soviet Union, are continually seeking closer economic and diplomatic ties with the West.

The Soviet Union's third major objective in southern Africa is to enhance its geostrategic posture. Its interests here are the same as the United States: enhanced positioning along the Cape sea route, air and naval bases,

and the like. There is one important difference. Where the United States desires to preserve its access to the strategically important minerals found in southern Africa, many analysts sense that the Soviet Union would like to be able to deny the United States and its Western allies this access. The Soviet Union can afford to take this position because it is self-sufficient in these minerals. Though it is not yet in a position to deny the US access to these resources, the Soviet Union may have markedly increased its ability to deny America's strategic air and naval forces access to the air and sea lanes of the region in time of conflict. Angola provides the Soviets with air and naval bases, warehousing, and communications facilities. Mozambique allows air and ship visits, but nothing else. Nevertheless, this gives the Soviet Union a network of bases from which to affect its regional land (support of national liberation movements), sea, and air interests.

Finally, the Soviets seek to generate additional respect for its status as a superpower. Through such image building they hope to, among other things, win the African states' political support for its initiatives in international fora. In this regard, the Soviets have done much to establish themselves as a friend of Black Africa. Their ability to project power to influence the outcome of the Angolan civil war demonstrated their capabilities and their willingness to use those capabilities in the struggle

against anti-colonialism and racism (though most African leaders have grown to dislike communism and geopolitics, they dislike racism more, and were therefore willing to allow the Soviet Union and China into their countries to combat this ill). Consequently, they benefit from the voting of the African bloc in organizations like the United Nations, and are now sought after as a mediator in settling international disputes.

Appraisal of the Soviet Union

From the discussion above, one must conclude that since the close of World War II, the Soviet Union's security assistance programs have successfully contributed to their regional and global objectives. Regionally, they have outlasted the Chinese, and out-performed the United States. Globally, they have enhanced their geostrategic position significantly, and have managed through these accomplishments to enhance their status as a superpower. The one noticeable weakspot, however, is their failure to spread the Marxist-Leninist ideology further and with a more lasting effect. Ironically, this one failure may be sufficient to erase all the gains the Soviets have accrued in the region in the past four decades.

Their interaction with the states of the region is more formal than that of the United States because they have signed long-term treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with

both Angola and Mozambique (1976 and 1977 respectively). A large number of military and civilian technicians are present in these countries which has the effect of strengthening the level of interaction between the Soviet Union and the supported states. As mentioned earlier, however, the failure of the Soviet Union to meet the economic needs of these states, has caused these bonds to loosen. From another perspective, it is unlikely that the Soviets looked favorably upon the "abandonment" of the African National Congress (ANC) by Angola and Mozambique. This occurred when Angola (February 1984) and Mozambique (March 1984) signed agreements with South Africa wherein they agreed not to permit the ANC to use their territories as bases of operations against South Africa. Hence, though bilateral treaties exist, Angola and Mozambique are drifting away from their benefactor.

Finally, as indicated above in the economic discussion, the expectations of Angola and Mozambique far outdistanced the actual outcomes of Soviet security assistance. Additionally, and very importantly, the Soviet Union's security assistance programs have failed to adequately contribute to ending the crippling insurgencies each country faces; nor have they been able to adequately combat the famines, droughts, and disease epidemics plaguing these states.

On balance, the Soviet Union's security assistance programs have been more effective than those of the United States in southern Africa. If any changes occur, however, they will likely be away from the Soviet Union and towards the West.

Notes

1. Dimitri Simes, "Pretoria's 'Little Flirtation' with Moscow." Los Angeles Times 14 March 1988.
2. Colin Legum, "The African Crisis." Foreign Affairs 57 (1979): p. 633.
3. "Cuba Offers to Pull 40,000 Troops from Angola under New Proposal." The Kansas City Times 14 March 1988: B9.
4. W.C.J. van Rensburg and D.A. Pretorius, South Africa's Strategic Minerals: Pieces on a Continental Chessboard, Johannesburg: Valiant Publishers, 1977: p. 50.
5. Ibid.
6. Courtland Cox, "Western Strategy in Southern Africa." US Military Involvement in Southern Africa, Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned African Scholars, eds. Boston: 1978. p. 43.
7. Ibid, p. 46.
8. Stephen Weissman, "The CIA and US Policy in Zaire and Angola", in Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa, Ellen Ray, et al eds, (Secaucus, N.J.: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1980), pp. 192-193.
9. Iain Hamilton, "Angola after Independence: Struggle for Supremacy." Conflict Studies 64 (Nov. 1975): p. 14.
10. Charles B. McLane, Soviet-African Relations. London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1974: p. 13. McLane's characterization of how the Soviets viewed each group is in the next three sentences.
11. Peter Janke, "Marxist Statecraft in Africa: What Future." Conflict Studies 95 (May 1978): p. 4.

12. Ibid.

13. Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union, China, and the West in Southern Africa." Foreign Affairs 54-4 (July 1976): p. 752.

14. McLane, p.12.

15. Jennifer S. Whitaker, "How to Assist Moscow in Africa." The New York Times 17 April 1986, p. 27.

CHAPTER SIX

THE HORN OF AFRICA, SUDAN, AND EAST AFRICA

Part One: Effectiveness of the United States

Part Two: Effectiveness of the Soviet Union

Part One: Effectiveness of the United States

The Horn of Africa, Sudan, and East Africa comprise an area of strategic significance for the superpowers. In addition to forming a junction where Black and Arab Africa meet, this region lies in close proximity to some of the world's most important sea routes: the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aden, the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits, and the Indian Ocean. Additionally, it also lies in close proximity to the oil fields of the Persian Gulf-an area of critical importance to the West and Japan. As a result, the United States has historically pursued three main objectives in this region: preservation of free access to the sea lanes of the region, and the oil of Southwest Asia; countering the Soviet Union's destabilization efforts in the area; and promotion of democracy and the free market system in these states.

Two major requirements associated with the first objective of preserving free access to the sea lanes and Persian Gulf oil are the need to protect the sea lanes from interdiction, and the need to be able to project power into the region. The United States has attempted to do this using a variety of means. First, it has sought to improve defense cooperation with each of the states of the region. As early as 1953, seven years after establishing a presence in Ethiopia, the United States signed two major military

assistance agreements with Ethiopia. The first agreement led to Ethiopia receiving 350 million dollars in economic aid and 293 million dollars in military aid between 1951 and 1976:

Figure 6-1: US Security Assistance to the States of The Horn of Africa, Sudan, and East Africa 1950-1984 (Dollars in Thousands)

	<u>50-77</u>	<u>78-80</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>
Djibouti						
IMET	0	0	0	57	113	106
MAP	0	0	0	0	1475	2000
FMS	0	0	0	0	1501	1
Ethiopia						
IMET	22700	0	0	0	0	0
MAP	182948	0	0	0	0	0
FMS	86561	0	0	0	0	0
Kenya						
IMET	1487	1275	517	911	1221	1505
MAP	0	0	0	10000	8500	12000
FMS	64965	50250	21887	6090	13577	17597
Somalia						
IMET	0	0	356	445	504	1023
MAP	0	0	0	15000	15000	32000
FMS	0	0	29039	39493	5571	21789
Sudan						
IMET	802	918	539	1139	1196	1446
MAP	0	0	0	0	43000	45000
FMS	82630	5138	29504	80712	30496	48479
Uganda						
IMET	0	0	26	55	70	60
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	0

Notes

1. IMET: International Military Education and Training Program; MAP: Military Assistance Program; FMS: Foreign Military Sales. See Chapter Three for further explanation.
2. * symbol indicates that data were not available.
3. Commercial export deliveries data were not included.
4. 1988 data is proposed amount.
5. Ethiopia's funding started in 1953, and ended in 1977.
6. Kenya's IMET started in 1975; its FMS began in 1976.
7. Sudan's IMET started in 1960; its FMS figure for 50-77 came in 1977.

Sources

Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 1988.

Fiscal Year Series (as of September 1986), Defense Security Assistance Agency, 1986.

Figure 6-2: US Security Assistance to the States of The Horn of Africa, Sudan, and East Africa 1985-1988 (Dollars in Thousands)

	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>
Djibouti				
IMET	117	121	*	135
MAP	2500	1914	1000	2000
FMS	1319	4989	2000	2000
Ethiopia				
IMET	0	0	0	0
MAP	0	0	0	0
FMS	0	0	0	0
Kenya				
IMET	1859	1522	*	1600
MAP	20000	19140	7500	19000
FMS	22923	14171	10000	10000
Somalia				
IMET	1112	1110	*	1250
MAP	33000	19140	7500	22000
FMS	34368	20264	15000	15000

(Figure 8-2 continued)

Sudan				
IMET	1378	881	*	1000
MAP	45000	16140	5000	10000
FMS	39130	41967	10000	10000
	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>
Uganda				
IMET	6	0	0	0
MAP	0	0	0	0
FMS	0	0	0	0

Notes/Sources

(Same as Figure 6-1.)

Additionally, approximately 2,813 Ethiopian officers and pilots received military training in the United States.¹ In return, the second agreement allowed the United States to build the Kagneu communications facility near Asmara. This communications base was ideally located well away from the magnetic influences of the North and South Magnetic Poles. Hence, at the time, it was considered to be a vital link in the US's military global communications network. Ethiopia's port of Massawa on the Red Sea also contributed to the US's strategic posture in the region. By 1974, however, developments in satellite communications, the acquisition of facilities on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, and the successful 1974 leftist coup in Ethiopia greatly reduced the importance of that state's role in protecting the sea lanes and providing the US with a means to project power. Nevertheless, the United States would have remained in Ethiopia had it not been for Ethiopia's major human rights

violations and their radical turn to the Soviet Union for military assistance. These events, which also involved Somalia, will be developed in subsequent paragraphs of this chapter.

By 1979, Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti were playing key roles in America's attempts to improve its ability to preserve free access to the region's sea lanes and project power from the region. Somalia, in its turn away from the Soviet Union and towards the United States, presented the United States with valuable ports, airfields, and training facilities. The port of Berbera had undergone massive infrastructural improvements during the Soviet tenure in Somalia and the port of Mogadishu had also been upgraded. Airfields at both of these cities and one at Hargeisa proved to be of strategic value to the US military. Kenya, in exchange for economic assistance, grain, and the military assistance identified in Figures 6-1 and 6-2, made Mombasa's considerable port and airport facilities available to the United States for refueling, resupply, and repairs. Finally, Djibouti, though still viewed as a French responsibility, benefited from America's "burdensharing" outlook (discussed in Chapter Four). By this time the United States had become a major arms supplier to the region. Each of its military assistance programs focused on improving America's ability to rapidly deploy forces to the

area to protect its friends, allies, and vital resources in the adjoining region of Southwest Asia.

The discussion above has focused on the two major requirements that the US seeks to fulfill in pursuit of its first regional objective-preservation of free access to the region's sea lanes and Persian Gulf oil. The final requirement in this pursuit is centered on US efforts to enhance regional stability. This desire has been sufficiently intense to cause the US to be more generous with this region, in terms of economic assistance, than any other region of Africa (see Figure 4-5). Additionally, in a region where armed conflicts appear to be endemic, the United States has persistently argued for peaceful solutions to local conflicts. Ironically, its greatest adversary in this endeavor is not the Soviet Union, but Somalia. Somalia's relentless irredentist-inspired determination to "unify" all Somali peoples (there was never a Somali state until creation of the present one on July 1, 1960) has placed it at odds with each of its neighbors, the OAU, the US, and formerly the Soviet Union. It is the most significant threat to stability in the region.

Countering Soviet destabilization efforts in the region is the second main objective pursued by the United States. Ethiopia, Sudan, and Kenya have played the most prominent roles in this aspect of US policy in the region.

When the US formally established military contacts with Haile Selassie's Ethiopia in 1946, it was regarded as an anti-communist bastion. As figures 6-1 and 6-2 indicate, a great deal of military assistance was extended to Ethiopia based on that premise. The primary concern was the Soviet build-up of Somalia's military resources and infrastructure. Indeed, even as late as post-coup 1974, the US could be observed shipping heavy tanks to Ethiopia to balance Soviet military support of Somalia. It is ironic to note that during this time at least 22 future Dergue officers received military training in the United States.²

After Egypt, Sudan receives more military assistance from the United States than any other state in Africa. This occurs despite fluctuations in the US-Sudan relationship. As it had done in Ethiopia, the US established a military relationship with Sudan relatively early. Sudan remained a strong supporter of the West until the Numeiri coup of 1969; a coup largely assisted by the Soviet Union. Numeiri proved to be more of a Nasser-style Arab nationalist than a communist, so the Sudanese Communist Party, with Moscow's help, briefly overthrew him in a coup in 1971. Numeiri regained control of the country and quickly turned to the West and moderate Arab states for military and economic assistance. In the 1980s, he has repeatedly accused Ethiopia, Libya and the Soviet Union of aiding the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement, an insurgent group in his

country. Consequently, the US maintains, relatively speaking, high levels of aid to Sudan to prevent its loss (including the important port of Port Sudan) to the Soviet Union or its proxies: Ethiopia and Libya. An unplanned side-effect of this aid has been its role in supporting Numeiri's coercive tendencies. A "born-again" Muslim, Numeiri attempted to force Sharia law on the country in the early 1980s. Sudan's Arab, muslim north has a recent history of accomodation and consultation with its Black, Christian/animist south. Numeiri's authoritarian style, unknowingly supported by American military assistance, upset this tenuous balance and exacerbated the north-south armed conflict.

With the help of Egypt's Anwar Sadat, the United States and Somalia entered into a military assistance relationship in 1978. The Soviet Union had been aiding Ethiopia and Somalia during Somalia's 1977-1978 incursion into Ethiopia's portion of the Ogaden region. This duplicity compelled the Somalis to expel the Soviets. Having itself been ousted from Ethiopia, the US was eager and quick to respond to Somalia's requests for military assistance. Despite acquiring use of the base facilities identified above, there were many costs associated with entering into a military relationship with Somalia. First, this automatically threatened the long-standing US relationship with Kenya. Somalia claimed Kenya's Northern Frontier District as theirs

due to the number of Somali people living there. Interestingly, a few years earlier, Kenya and Ethiopia had entered into a military pact against the irredentist Somalis. Secondly, the US was interested in improving its relations with the OAU. The OAU's 1963 constitution recognized the inviolability of Africa's present day borders; the Somalis did not and thus they were a liability to the US. There have been many vacillations in US aid for Somalia, partly because of the threat a strong Somalia poses for its pro-Western neighbors. For example, when the Somalis needed aid in the summer of 1982 to halt an Ethiopian incursion into their territory, the US responded quickly with defensive equipment, anti-air weapons, small arms, radars, transportation equipment, and communications equipment. This equipment had been held from the Somalis since 1980, and pains were taken not to give them "an invasion capability".

The United States has credibly countered Soviet destabilization efforts in this region. However, it remains concerned about the 15,000-30,000 Cuban and Eastern bloc "advisers" in the region.

The final major objective pursued by the US in the region has been the promotion of democracy and the free-market system. In that regard, it was due to Ethiopia's human rights violations that the United States cut off 10 million dollars of military aid earmarked for Ethiopia in

1977.³ The US constantly praises and frequently rewards those states which attempt to govern themselves democratically. Kenya, Djibouti, and even Sudan receive favorable recognition under this program.

The United States appears to understand that it will take some time for free-market economies to take hold in these capital-poor countries. Djibouti and Kenya are frequently held up as examples of properly structured economies, while Sudan and Somalia continue to receive economic assistance intended to enhance economic reform.

Appraisal of the United States

The United States' security assistance program in this region has proved to be quite effective. Tribalism, regionalism, nationalism, religious conflicts, the political immaturity of these new states, and a host of other challenges greatly limit the amount of influence that any foreign power can have in this area.

In terms of effectiveness appraisal criteria one and two, one may conclude that the US has been quite effective in this region. Most of the actions taken by the US in the area have been in consonance with the five global roles traditionally pursued by the United States: anti-imperialist agent, defender of values, example, developer, and faithful ally. Only the last of these roles, faithful ally, was not performed well. This was mostly due to

Somalia frequently placing the US in a position where it had to decide whether to support Somalia, which equated to encouraging imperialism, or not to support them and risk being branded as uncooperative and unreliable. In the final analysis, however, the security assistance actions taken by the United States in this region were positive contributions to America's global objectives.

The United States' security assistance programs were also effective regionally. Programs in Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti, and Somalia have markedly strengthened the US's power projection capabilities. These states provide the US with an impressive military launching pad comprised of air and naval base use rights, overflight rights, refueling stations, repair facilities, training facilities, communications facilities, and storage sites. The US has reversed the decline of its strategic role in the area, and has returned to an even stronger position. It is now in a position to complement US arrangements with Oman (including Masirah Island and the port of Muscat) and Diego Garcia. Hence, though expenditures by the US on security assistance in this region are low compared to most other regions of the world, they are the highest in Africa.

The strength of the interaction between the US and the states it supports is good. Though no mutual defense treaties exist, the United States has a long-standing military relationship with Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan. With

the exception of the problems that it has with Somalia, the US has been reliable both economically and militarily. Valid complaints concerning the low dollar amounts of this aid do exist, and will certainly become more pronounced as the funding levels continue to decline.

Finally, the recipient states also seem to have benefited from this assistance. Kenya, Sudan, and Somalia, though hit hard by the famines of the early 1970s and early 1980s, received significantly more support from the US than did Ethiopia from the Soviet Union. Additionally, as mentioned above, the US has been viewed as a reliable partner for most of the years it has supported these states. The US's accidental contribution to internal strife in Sudan, and the regionally destabilizing effect that its support of Somalia has sometimes engendered, are the only drawbacks to an otherwise fine effort.

Part Two: Effectiveness of the Soviet Union

As one might expect, the Soviet Union pursues objectives in the region which are antithetical to those of the United States. Their three major objectives have been to spread their political influence in the area, to counter Western influence and control in the region as well as the influence and control of the PRC, and to enhance their own

geostrategic posture. Elements of each of these objectives have been present in virtually all of the actions undertaken by the USSR in the region.

Somalia was the focal point of the Soviet Union's initial actions to spread their influence in the region. The military relationship between these two countries began as early as 1961, 18 months after Somalia's independence. One of their first actions, conducted from 1963 to 1969, was to dredge the harbor of Berbera and build a fishing port there. Support of Siad Barre's coup in 1969 (Barre claimed himself to be a Marxist-Leninist) was their next prominent action. It coincided with the increasing prominence of two other developments: USSR global support of third world liberation movements, and their massive attempt to build a blue water navy capable of projecting power around the world. Supporting Barre enhanced attainment of both of these objectives. Berbera became the biggest Soviet base in the third world and gaining this location close to the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb was of great strategic importance to the Soviet Union. The Chinese were also in Somalia, but by the mid-1970s, domestic concerns had greatly reduced their profile in all of Africa. Indeed, much of the Soviet motivation for becoming involved with Somalia hinged on their desire to curb the influence of the PRC in that state.

By 1971 the Soviet Union had become well-established in the region and had realized all of their goals. Treaties

had been signed with Egypt (1971), India (1971), and Iraq (1971/1972). They were expelled from Egypt in 1972, and thus lost access to the important port of Mersa Matruh. By July 1974 however, a Somalia-Soviet Union defense treaty formalized the informal arrangement wherein the Soviet Union had gained de facto control of the ports and airfields around Berbera and Mogadishu. The Soviets built up Berbera to provide themselves with fuel storage, warehouse space, housing compounds, ship repair facilities (for ships up to 12,000 tons), long-runway airfields, and powerful long range communications facilities.⁴ Berbera became the nerve center for Soviet military operations in the Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Persian Gulf areas.

Much was done for the Somali military too. The Soviets began earnestly building up the Somali military in 1972. By 1974, they had provided Somalia with 80 million dollars in arms, equipment, and military training.⁵ Indeed, one analyst claims that of the 67 million dollars in military aid spent by the Soviets in 1975 in sub-saharan Africa, 63 million dollars went to Somalia.⁶ Though this build-up appears to have been unbridled, at least two constraints existed. First, the Soviets had no desire to build-up Somalia's offensive capability to the point where they could fulfill their irredentist ambitions. This would antagonize the OAU and Ethiopia, both of which were targets of the Soviet Union's effort to extend their influence on the continent.

Additionally, it had become clear that Siad Barre was far from being an ideological purist. In July of 1972 Barre publicly rejected African socialism and proclaimed himself to be a Marxist-Leninist. In reality, Siad viewed Marxism-Leninism as an ideology that could instill the discipline his society needed for economic, social and political development. Most of his 24 member Revolutionary Council shunned this ideology, and was not even pro-communist.⁷ As before, the Soviets found themselves in the midst of nationalists; and as before, the results were to be the same: expulsion.

The major reason for this expulsion was clear: the Soviets were aiding Somalia's adversary Ethiopia during hostilities between the two states in 1977-1978. This factor notwithstanding, there were at least two other reasons which accounted for the growing disaffection between these two states. First, the penetration of the Somali administrative structure had become irritatingly pervasive. The KGB organized and ran the National Security Service, and Soviet personnel controlled the economy, finance system, mass media, and education system. In that regard, they set up the Halane Political Orientation Center where a three month course of instruction familiarized civil servants with their roles in a Marxist-Leninist society. These initiatives were not without benefit as they created an administrative system where before there was none.

Nevertheless, nationalistic Somalis determined this level of involvement to be intrusive, and a schism began to develop. One might speculate that this was considered by the Soviets when they decided to "hedge their bets" by aiding Ethiopia. The second reason was Islam. This too may have influenced the Soviets to turn to Ethiopia. Somalia is 99.95% Islamic.⁸ The longer the Soviets stayed in the country, the clearer it became to them that there was absolutely no room for accomodation between Islam and Marxism-Leninism.

Noted Africanists Peter Vanneman and Martin James speculate on the Soviet turn towards Ethiopia thusly:

"Soviet air and naval facilities at Massawa and Assab in Ethiopia would be more valuable than those lost at the much touted base at Berbera in Somalia. The Ethiopian facilities are within easy reach of the main Saudi port at Jidda and the multi-billion dollar industrial complex now being constructed at Yenbo on the Red Sea. Thus they are perfectly positioned for support of efforts to destabilize Saudi Arabia and harass vital oil shipping lanes to Europe and Japan."⁹

This view is based on the belief that the Soviets seek to counter the West in the region by placing themselves in a position to deny the West access to oil, thus forcing the West to treat the Soviet Union as the region's major power. Though the motivation for this Soviet action may never be known, their resolve has been clearly demonstrated. From 1974 to 1985 the Soviet Union provided Ethiopia with more than four billion dollars in military aid-a large amount for

an African state.¹⁰ Though this aid significantly contributed to the Ethiopian defeat of the Somali invasion force in 1978, it did little to help the country during the famines of the early 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, Soviet assistance has not been sufficient to quell the regional insurgencies in Eritrea (whom the Soviets once supported), Tigre or Oromo. As it did in Somalia, the Soviet KGB controls the security service and portions of the Ethiopian army. This internal spread of Soviet influence may be more long-lived than it was in Somalia. This is because in 1986 a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party was established to "properly direct" Ethiopian society. The greatest liability the Soviets face in the region is the image they have acquired of being geopolitical opportunists who will desert a friend if the price is right.

Sudan and Uganda were also lands where the Soviets tried to achieve the three objectives stated above. Uganda's chronic civil conflicts and landlocked position caused it to receive only the scarcest of glances from the US or the USSR. The USSR provided Uganda's President Idi Amin with a very limited amount of support in the mid-1970s but abruptly terminated its dealings with Amin. As Figures 6-1 and 6-2 indicate, the US also "wrote off" Uganda.

Sudan was another matter. It offered the Soviets a strategically important port (Port Sudan) and a chance to dislodge American influence in a state which bordered eight

other "potential areas of influence". Unfortunately for the Soviets, their actions in this state, chronicled above, led them down a familiar path: expulsion.

Appraisal of the Soviet Union

The Soviet Union's security assistance efforts have been only marginally effective in this region. Like the United States, the Soviet Union has learned that there are limits to how much they can influence a state of this region or any other.


The Soviet "occupation" of Ethiopia certainly contributes to its global goals of power projection enhancement, and spreading the Marxist-Leninist revolution. It is also a major complement to the Soviet's eastern position on the Bab-el-Mandeb straits-PDRY. However, Sudan and Somalia still loom as big losses to the US. These losses also cause the USSR to be assessed a minus for their attempts to realize their regional objectives. Additionally, the United States can claim successes in Kenya and Djibouti for which the Soviet Union has no parallel.

Moscow's 14 year association with Ethiopia and their mutual defense treaty are indicative of a strong level of interaction. This level of interaction is somewhat tinged, however, by what the Soviet Union did to Somalia in 1977-1978 where they had a comparable level of interaction.

Finally, the Soviet Union would likely receive poor marks from the states which received their assistance. To their credit they aided in establishing more credible administrative systems in Somalia and Ethiopia. Additionally, both states received the arms they needed to defend themselves. Each of these developments carried several costs. In setting up administrative systems, the Soviets became very intrusive. Furthermore, very little infrastructural development made its way to areas which did not directly benefit the Soviets. Finally, the greatest failures of the Soviet Union in this region have been its inability to provide Ethiopia with the economic assistance needed to combat its famines, and its failure to assist the central government in a way which allows it to quell the regional insurgencies. These failures are quite similar to those noted for southern Africa.

NOTES

1. Fred Halliday, "US Policy in the Horn of Africa: Aboulia or Proxy Intervention?" Review of African Political Economy 10 (Sep-Dec 1977): p. 10.
2. Ibid, p. 15.
3. Mary Kay Magistad, "On the Razor's Edge". Africa Report (May-June 1987): p. 61.
4. Brian Crozier, "The Soviet Presence in Somalia". Conflict Studies 54 (Feb 1975): p. 9.
5. Ibid, p. 4.
6. Ibid.
7. Colin Legum and Bill Lee, The Horn of Africa in Continuing Crisis. New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1979: p. 85.
8. Thomas Ofcansky, "The Horn of Africa". Journal of Defense and Diplomacy (February 1987): p. 30.
9. Peter Vanneman and Martin James, "Soviet Thrust into the Horn of Africa: The Next Targets". Strategic Review 6 (Spring 1978): p. 34.
10. Magistad, p. 61.



CHAPTER SEVEN

WEST AND EQUATORIAL AFRICA

Part One: Effectiveness of the United States

Part Two: Effectiveness of the Soviet Union

Part One: Effectiveness of the United States

Twenty-five countries comprise the West/Equatorial Africa realm. Despite having great territorial extent, there is a large measure of social, cultural, and political homogeneity in the area resulting from predominance of the French influence there. 14 of the 25 countries were once French colonies/territories: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Rwanda and Burundi could easily be included in this group as they too are francophone states. Four of the remaining nine countries were British colonies: Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. As Portugal once ruled over the Cape Verde Islands, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome-Principe, only Liberia can be said to have been spared the colonial interlude portion of African history.

There are two important notions hinted at above. First, this region is, owing to its past history, a "French lake". Secondly, it is a region which is predisposed to Western influence; again, this is due to the colonization of this realm by Western European powers. Consequently, the United States often finds itself in the position of complementing or supplementing French, and to a lesser extent, British military assistance efforts in the region:

Figure 7-1: Value of Arms Transfers, Cumulative 1981-1985.
By Major Supplier and Recipient Country
(Millions of Dollars)

Supplier:	(Total)	USA	France	UK	USSR
Recipient					
Benin	65	0	5	0	50
Burkina Faso	40	0	0	10	0
Burundi	50	0	10	0	30
Cameroon	245	40	100	10	0
Cape Verde	30	0	0	0	30
*Central African Rep.	10	0	10	0	0
*Chad	65	10	50	0	0
Congo	190	0	0	0	180
Equatorial Guinea	40	0	0	0	0
*Gabon	200	0	160	0	0
Gambia, The	0	0	0	0	0
Ghana	30	5	0	0	0
Guinea	25	0	0	0	25
Guinea-Bissau	60	0	0	0	60
*Ivory Coast	170	0	170	0	0
Liberia	30	30	0	0	0
Mali	65	0	0	0	60
Mauritania	45	0	10	0	0
*Niger	20	0	10	0	0
Nigeria	1820	100	320	410	0
*Rwanda	5	0	5	0	0

(Figure 7-1 continued)

	<u>(Total)</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Sao Tome & Principe	0	0	0	0	0
*Senegal	30	0	30	0	0
*Sierra Leone	5	0	5	0	0
*Togo	50	0	40	0	0

Notes

*: of the 25 countries listed, France supplies 50% or more of the arms transfers of 9 countries.

Source

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986, pp. 143-144.

Figure 7-2: US Security Assistance to the States of West and Equatorial Africa 1950-1988 (Dollars in Thousands)

	<u>50-79</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>88</u>
Benin	(No aid programs from 1950-1988)									
Burkina Faso										
IMET	115	85	67	82	115	34	17	38	0	0
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Burundi										
IMET	0	0	0	32	39	136	146	140	0	0
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cameroon										
IMET	38	44	23	39	87	96	132	225	*	250
MAP	239	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	500	0
FMS	4388	4	1496	13918	212	2183	754	18450	10	10

(Figure 7-2 continued)

	50-79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
Cape Verde										
IMET	0	0	0	0	4	49	56	39	0	0
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C.A.R.										
IMET	0	0	0	23	49	88	102	120	*	125
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	500	1000
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chad										
IMET	0	0	0	0	34	245	278	319	*	200
MAP	0	0	0	0	24049	2000	5000	5742	5000	9000
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	1318	5531	5479	5000	5000
Congo										
IMET	0	0	0	30	55	4	0	0	0	0
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eq. Guinea										
IMET	0	0	0	28	56	54	72	59	*	75
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	957	0	1000
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gabon										
IMET	0	51	50	60	110	95	124	150	*	150
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FMS	2239	0	0	0	0	3937	0	0	5000	5000
Gambia										
IMET	0	0	0	0	0	0	60	55	0	0
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ghana										
IMET	1076	188	199	295	256	237	279	212	0	0
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	300	0	0
FMS	390	126	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guinea										
IMET	89	0	0	0	48	90	108	153	*	150
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	1500	3000	1914	1000	3000
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	1499	121	2706	4000	4000

(Figure 7-2 continued)

	50-79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
Guinea Bissau										
IMET	0	0	0	11	16	13	4	0	0	0
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	300	0	0
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ivory Coast										
IMET	103	13	24	36	38	153	137	121	0	0
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	500	0	0
Liberia										
(Funding amounts are too large to be represented here. See notes below)										
Mali										
IMET	1055	101	105	99	122	144	146	155	0	0
MAP	1865	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FMS	155	5	5	5	5	5	5	37	0	0
Mauritania										
IMET	0	0	26	29	57	74	65	59	0	0
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	750	0	0
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Niger										
IMET	11	0	210	327	209	194	206	228	*	250
MAP	52	0	0	0	1000	2000	6000	4228	1500	3000
FMS	8	0	0	0	714	624	2182	8376	2000	2000
Nigeria										
IMET	1507	0	0	0	0	0	0	94	0	0
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FMS	28685	15464	3587	1520	5411	343	7657	889	0	0
Rwanda										
IMET	0	52	33	5	62	2	63	75	0	0
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	750	0	0
FMS	0	0	1225	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Senegal										
IMET	424	162	182	313	308	477	535	452	*	475
MAP	2646	0	0	0	0	2000	4450	3270	1000	2000
FMS	6	0	0	0	0	1339	2110	2969	2000	2000

(Figure 7-2 continued)

	<u>50-79</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>88</u>
Sierra Leone										
IMET	0	0	0	22	31	40	60	60	0	0
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	750	885	0	0
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	0	67	486	0	0
Togo										
IMET	23	30	32	36	49	31	37	51	0	0
MAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	300	0	0	0
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Notes

1. IMET: International Military Education and Training Program; MAP: Military Assistance Program; FMS: Foreign Military Sales Program. See Chapter Three for further explanation.
2. * symbol indicates that data were not available.
3. Commercial exports deliveries data were not included.
4. 1988 data is the proposed amount.
5. Liberia IMET: 50-79: 3869 83: 677 86: 864
80: 227 84: 761 87: *
81: 596 85: 1157 88: 900
82: 594

Liberia MAP: 50-79: 5290 83: 6000 86: 4785
80: 0 84: 12000 87: 1000
81: 991 85: 12000 88: 3000
82: 5000

Liberia FMS: 50-79: 4163 83: 8450 86: 2611
80: 94 84: 10886 87: 10000
81: 2983 85: 11686 88: 10000
82: 10000

Sources

Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs,
Fiscal Year 1988.

Fiscal Year Series (as of September 1986), Defense Security
Assistance Agency, 1986.

Owing to the method with which data for Figure 7-1 was collected, it represents a more constricted portrayal of American involvement in this region than do Figures 7-2 and 4-5. Nevertheless, taken together, all of these figures indicate that the United States has actively pursued a variety of interests in the region.

One category of interests are political-ideological in nature. As it has elsewhere, the United States has sought to encourage governments possessing a Western orientation to maintain this perspective. Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Senegal, and Liberia have received much of their aid from the US not only because of their possession of this orientation, but also because of their support of Western positions in international fora. In that regard, Liberia's traditional devotion to the West (indeed, as a state it is a Western creation) has garnered it big dividends over the years (see Figure 7-2). A corollary of this interest is America's desire to support state's whose institutions and human rights practices are based upon the democratic model. This relates to America's defender of values role mentioned in Chapter Four. Part of the French

legacy in this region is the presence of mostly unitary forms of government. Though the centralization of power which is a characteristic of this form of government is often quite advisable in states torn by regionalism, ethnic rivalries, and the like, it also accounts for the reluctance of many states to extend democratic freedoms to their citizens. Additionally, more than the other regions previously studied, this is a region of coup d'etats:

Figure 7-3: Successful Coups d'Etat in Africa, 1958-1984

<u>Date</u>	<u>Country</u>
Nov 17, 1958	Sudan
Jan 13, 1963	Togo*
Aug 15, 1963	Congo-Brazzaville*
Oct 23, 1963	Dahomey (now Benin)*
Jan 12, 1964	Zanzibar
Jun 19, 1965	Algeria
Nov 25, 1965	Zaire
Nov 29, 1965	Dahomey (now Benin)*
Dec 22, 1965	Dahomey*
Jan 1, 1966	Central African Rep.*
Jan 3, 1966	Upper Volta* (now Burkina Faso)
Jan 15, 1966	Nigeria*
Feb 24, 1966	Ghana*
Jul 8, 1966	Burundi*
Jul 29, 1966	Nigeria*
Nov 28, 1966	Burundi*
Jan 13, 1967	Togo*
Mar 23, 1967	Sierra Leone*
Dec 17, 1967	Dahomey*

Apr 18, 1968
Aug 3-31, 1968
Nov 19, 1968

May 25, 1969
Sep 1, 1969
Oct 21, 1969
Dec 10, 1969

Jan 25, 1971

Jan 13, 1972
Oct 26, 1972

Jul 5, 1973

Feb 8, 1974
Apr 15, 1974
Sep 12 1974

Apr 13, 1975
Jul 29, 1975

Nov 1, 1976

Mar 18, 1977

Jul 5, 1978
Jul 10, 1978

Feb 8, 1979
May 27, 1979
Jun 4, 1979
Aug 4, 1979
Oct 9, 1979

Jan 4, 1980
Apr 12, 1980
May 12, 1980
Nov 15, 1980
Nov 24, 1980

Sep 1, 1981
Dec 31, 1981

Nov 7, 1982

May 18, 1983
Aug 4, 1983
Dec 31, 1983

April 3, 1984

Sierra Leone*
Congo-Brazzaville*
Mali*

Sudan
Libya
Somalia
Dahomey*

Uganda

Ghana*
Dahomey*

Rwanda*

Upper Volta*
Niger*
Ethiopia

Chad*
Nigeria*

Burundi*

Congo-Brazzaville*

Ghana*
Mauritania*

Congo-Brazzaville*
Mauritania*
Ghana*
Eq. Guinea*
Central African Rep.*

Mauritania*
Liberia*
Uganda
Guinea-Bissau*
Upper Volta*

Central African Rep.*
Ghana*

Upper Volta*

Upper Volta*
Upper Volta*
Nigeria*

Guinea*

Notes

* indicates countries in the West/Equatorial Africa region.

Source

Welch, Claude E., Jr. "From 'Armies of Africans' to 'African Armies': The Evolution of Military Forces in Africa," in African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities, Bruce E. Arlinghaus and Pauline H. Baker, eds., (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 14-15.

In consolidating their positions, each new leader is normally predisposed to establish even more controls rather than extend freedoms to the populace. More often than not, freedom of the press and freedom of speech are viewed as "regime busters" and thus the antithesis of political development. Another challenge exists resulting from the poverty of these states. Most leaders in this region are predisposed to encourage individuals to subordinate their own wants and desires to the wants and desires of the community or state. This view, which builds on traditional African values of family and community, holds that such an orientation is the only means by which the abject poverty of these societies can be overcome. Hence, individual freedoms lose their importance unless it can be demonstrated that such freedoms and development are not mutually exclusive, but interdependent. The Ivory Coast, Senegal, Liberia, and Sierra Leone provide relatively good examples of this interdependence, and the US supports them accordingly.

Additionally, where it senses that bonds between the Soviet Union and a client state are weakening, the US has tried to enhance that state's ability to disengage from the Soviet Union. These efforts have been successful in Equatorial Guinea and Guinea. Figure 7-2 reveals how the gains that the US senses it is making in these countries are, generally speaking, steadily built upon year after year. In addition to shifting from the East to the West, each of these states also faces the challenges mentioned above.

Regional stability is another interest pursued by the United States in this realm. Libyan expansionism based upon Colonel Kaddafi's Third International Theory (Capitalism and Communism being the other two) is the greatest threat to this interest. Though Libya received almost five billion dollars in military hardware from the Soviet Union between 1981 and 1985 to spread its influence in the region, it is hardly a puppet of Soviet design.¹ Chad, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, and Niger are the focal points of the US effort to counter Libyan destabilization efforts. In these states and most of the others in the region, the U.S. has been careful to shore up those aspects of the armed forces which are essential to preserving the territorial integrity of the recipient state. For example, Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon have received naval patrol craft to protect their coast and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The

region's land-locked states have also benefited. Beginning in earnest with 24 million dollars of emergency military aid to Chad in 1983 (see Figure 7-2), the United States has successfully complemented and supplemented French security assistance efforts. There have been many spin-off benefits of these policies. The port of Douala, Cameroon, used by the US and France to ship supplies to Chad was vastly improved to support this effort. Cameroon's commercial sector continues to reap the benefits of this improvement. Additionally, a number of roads and bridges were significantly upgraded. This enabled a much enhanced level of trade to occur between Chad, Cameroon and C.A.R.. Economic integration of this type normally leads to a greater level of stability in a region.

U.S. security assistance policies have also targeted the nation-building roles of the militaries in this region as a means to improve stability. This approach focuses upon the potentials that African military organizations have for executing civil works projects. This policy has proven to be immensely successful in Liberia and Senegal and will likely be expanded in the future.

Having examined U.S. security assistance actions in terms of the U.S.'s political-ideological and regional stability interests, one could easily come to sense that U.S. policies in the region are largely based upon altruism. This is almost never the case in any country's security

assistance policy. It is true, however, that there is comparatively little territory of geostrategic value, and therefore little incentive, to the United States in this realm. The U.S. does indeed seek to preserve Western access to the ports and airfields of the region, but none of these states possesses something of vital necessity to the United States.

Economic motives are a dynamic for some of this assistance. Though less than three per cent of the US's international trade is conducted with this region, the United States has an interest in promoting free market economies in these states. Cameroon and Gabon are two of several states which actively encourage foreign investment and receive favorable treatment from the United States because of their economic policies. Economic reform efforts, such as those undertaken by Equatorial Guinea and the Central African Republic are also supported by the US. Each of these states is earnestly attempting to transition from socialism to capitalism. As much of the region is in the midst of a similar change, the West has determined it to be in their interests for such transitions to be effective.

Appraisal of the United States

The United States' security assistance program has been quite effective in this region. Its position in achieving its regional and global objectives is good with one major

exception. The US has sought to reduce Soviet influence in the region but has been largely unsuccessful in Benin, the Cape Verde Islands, the Congo, Mali, and Burundi. The Soviet Union has managed to maintain its position of influence in each of these states for at least a decade. More importantly, they have used the Congo as part of their global power projection grid, and the Cape Verde Islands have begun to play a similar role. US efforts to curb this trend have met with some success because, as these relatively new states have matured politically, they have become increasingly disaffected with Soviet policies and practices.

Owing to the region's strong historical linkages to Europe, the US has, in most cases, been relegated to a secondary role. Nevertheless, the US has particularly strong levels of interaction with a variety of countries. For example, of the three formal defense agreements the US possesses with states on the continent, one of them is with Liberia. Gabon and the Ivory Coast have never received assistance from a communist country and this has endeared them to France and the United States. Cameroon, Liberia, and Senegal are particularly noteworthy here owing to their long term, substantial assistance relationships with the United States. Each of these states has also been quite vocal in its support of American positions in international fora.

Finally, there is much disagreement concerning whether or not the recipient states actually benefited from US (and European) security assistance to the region. One group senses that the infusion of arms and military materiel into the region is the culprit for the large number of coups d'etat and military brutality. Ali Mazrui, author of The Africans is a leading proponent of this theory. At the other pole are those who believe that this assistance has, in effect, led to the re-colonization of the region. Rawlings of Ghana and Sankara of Burkina Faso have frequently commented on this "backwards development". Nevertheless, it is clear that the new emphasis on linking security assistance to civil projects development by the military and on nation building is well received and is likely to reap long term dividends for the recipient states. It is a development that the Soviets may not be able to match.

Effectiveness of the Soviet Union

Soviet interests in West/Equatorial Africa closely parallel those of the United States. Politically and ideologically, its interests in this region are as they have been in other the other regions studied: to neutralize and/or replace Western and Chinese influence; to support wars of national liberation; and to encourage the

development of Marxist-Leninist political parties throughout the states of the region.

In 1958, Guinea became the Soviet Union's first success in the region. Under the leadership of Sekou Toure, Guinea embarked upon a socialist path of political and economic development. State farms, state-run industry, and a state sponsored work force were emphasized as the means to bring about "real" development. When it withdrew from the Franc Zone in 1958 and declined membership in all major monetary, trade, and cultural agreements with francophone Africa, it turned to both the Soviet Union and China for assistance.² Toure's brand of socialism, the African socialism referred to in Chapter Four, immediately clashed with Moscow's ideas. By 1961, Guinea had expelled the Soviet ambassador for meddling in Guinea's internal affairs. This rift was corrected later, but not to the extent that Leonid Brezhnev's 1976 classification of Guinea as a long time friend of the Soviet Union could be considered accurate.³ The relationship between these two countries remains tenuous, allowing the US to slowly expand its influence there.

Ghana was also an early recipient of Soviet aid. Like Guinea, it also sought a path of socialist development. Kwame Nkrumah led this effort and enjoyed strong ties with the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China until his

ouster in 1966. He was replaced by a decidedly more pro-Western regime which ended its relationship with the East.

Mali, the Congo, and Benin were also courted early by Moscow. Despite 20 years of close relations with the Soviet Union, in 1981 Mali decided to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy. This followed the 1968 overthrow of the pro-Soviet Keita regime; another setback for the Soviet Union. Though it still maintains a military assistance program in Mali, this development was a major defeat for the Soviet Union. The Congo and Benin have been much more loyal to their benefactors. Each state has officially declared itself to be Marxist-Leninist; the Congo in 1970 and Benin in 1974. Soviet support of both of these states was largely due to its desire to encourage domestic communist movements. Additionally, however, each of these states was used as part of the logistical network which supported the wars of national liberation in Portuguese Africa.

Geostrategic interests are the final major type of interest pursued by the USSR in this region. The Soviet objective here is to enhance their ability to project power on the continent and globally. The Soviets made great gains to this end in the 1960s and 1970s. During this time it signed air and/or naval base use rights/access agreements with Benin, the Congo, Guinea, and Mali. During this same period, however, the Soviets were also asked to remove or reduce their military presence in Equatorial Guinea,

Nigeria, Chad, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and the Cape Verde Islands.⁴ Despite these setbacks, the Soviets were able to establish a formidable line of communications to support insurgencies in Angola and Rhodesia during the 1970s.

Appraisal of the Soviet Union

Author J. B. Wright provides a good summary of the effectiveness of Soviet efforts in this region over the last two decades:

" Francophone Africa has not presented the Soviet Union with any major opportunities since independence for gaining influence. There has been no "liberation struggle" such as in Angola which would have enabled the USSR to force a victory for the side with the greatest Marxist-Leninist potential, and no confrontation over irredentist demands, as in the Horn of Africa, where influence and the grant of facilities were the initial reward of military support.⁵

" Only in Mali, where Soviet aid has been largely military, can the USSR look back on twenty years of fairly close relations. The only other countries of the thirteen where relations have been anything other than strained are Benin and the Congo."⁶

It appears that Soviet gains in the region were largely due to their seizure of opportunities, and not due to some grand design. Consequently, there have been many actions taken which were not based upon detailed analyses. This may account for the failures in relations mentioned above.

Currently, the USSR has assumed a much lower profile in the region.

The Soviet Union has been only moderately effective in this region. In assessing its realization of its regional and global goals, one may conclude that it has enhanced its position geostrategically, but has basically failed in its attempt to spread the Marxist-Leninist ideology throughout the area. Additionally, as the citation above indicates, its interaction with its friends in the region has been highly erratic. This may have been more an indication of the political immaturity of these states than an indication of Soviet mismanagement. Finally, with the exception of aid rendered to Nigeria during the 1967-1970 Biafran War, Soviet aid has been only marginally beneficial. Moscow's friends frequently criticize the Soviet Union for its shortfalls in promised equipment and training.⁷ Soviet economic aid could have quieted these complaints, but as David E. Albright, author of Africa and International Communism notes, the Soviets had long since given up that approach:

"In francophone as well as anglophone Black Africa, the Soviet Union has given the appearance of having temporarily abandoned competition with China as a donor of non-military aid."⁸

NOTES

1. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986, p. 143.
2. Alan C.G. Best and Harm J. de Blij, African Survey, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), p. 209.
3. Morris Rothenberg, The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power, (Coral Gables: Advanced International Studies Institute in association with the Univ. of Miami, 1980), p. 4.
4. Rothenberg.
5. J.B. Wright, "Francophone Black Africa Since Independence," Conflict Studies, 130, (May, 1981), p. 6.
6. Wright, p. 8.
7. Edward J. Laurance, "Soviet Arms Transfers in the 1980s: Declining Influence in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Arms for Africa, Bruce E. Arlinghaus, ed. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C Heath & Co., 1983), p. 48.
8. David E. Albright, ed., Africa and International Communism, (New York: McMillan, 1980), p. 49.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

This analysis has used four criteria to appraise the effectiveness of the security assistance programs of the United States and the Soviet Union in three geographic realms of sub-saharan Africa. The results of this evaluation compel one to conclude that the Soviet Union's program has been more effective than that of the United States, but the gap is steadily closing.

The first two criteria dealt with the ability of the US/USSR to realize their regional and global objectives in sub-saharan Africa. The objectives pursued by each of these superpowers may be grouped into two main categories: geostrategic and political-ideological.

Geostrategically, the USSR's policies have been substantially more effective than those of the United States. The Soviet Union has built a network of air, naval, and supply bases that has enabled it to project power anywhere on the continent of Africa from the Soviet Union. Obviously, this capability could be used to project power from Africa elsewhere. Figures 8-1 and 8-2 underscore these observations, and reveal how the US lags in this area:

Air Facilities

USA

USSR

Liberia
Somalia


Guinea Bissau
Angola
Mozambique
Ethiopia

USA

USSR

Liberia
Somalia

Angola
Ethiopia



Source

Phillip R. Cook Jr., Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States, (United States Dept. of State, Pub. 9112, Dec. 1985) p. 20.

Figure 8-2 reveals some alarming trends which illustrate Soviet strengths and American weaknesses in base access and overflight rights since 1950:

Figure 8-2: Trends in US and Soviet Access to Airfields or
Airspace: Mid-1950s vs. 1987

High Confidence US Access:
Mid-1950s

All states on the African
continent except Egypt

High Confidence USSR Access:
Mid-1950s

None

High Confidence US Access:
1987

None

(However, the following states
can be classified as "Western
aligned, US access uncertain,
but blocking Soviets": Morocco,
Egypt, Somalia, Kenya, Zaire,
Comoros, Liberia)

High Confidence USSR Access:
1987

Libya
Ethiopia
Guinea
Congo
Angola
Mozambique
Seychelles

Source

Discriminate Deterrence. Report of The Commission on
Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Fred C. Ikle and Albert
Wohlstetter, Co-chairmen, (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 24-25.

Figure 8-2 appears to render an overly bleak assessment of US access to airfields as Somalia, Kenya, Zaire, and Liberia have each established their reliability to extend overflight rights and base access to the United States in the past.

The United States has fared much better in the political-ideological realm. The US's methodology here has been to build upon the historic Western presence in the area by working closely with the former colonial powers of the realm. In this effort, economic aid has been used more extensively than military aid which is a dramatically different approach than the Soviets who favor military aid. The US has shunned the all-inclusive treaties of friendship and cooperation that the Soviets favor, seeking instead to encourage allegiance through more informal, less involved trade and technical expertise agreements. This approach has been largely successful in all of Africa's regions except southern Africa (see Chapter 5). Additionally, in those areas where America has "lost" to the Soviets, political and economic failures have loosened the Soviets' grip.

The Soviets began their "African adventure" without a well-defined role for ideology, and no grand strategy for what it hoped to accomplish. Consequently, over the years they were to learn that their scheme for classifying a state as Marxist-Leninist, progressive, socialist, or the like, was sorely wanting. There have been several other constraints on the Soviets in this region: the historic presence of the West vs. the Soviet's newcomer status (even China preceded them there); their distance from Africa; and African nationalism. Major setbacks to their efforts to spread Marxism-Leninism occurred in Ghana, Mali, the Sudan,

Somalia, Burundi, Guinea, and Equatorial Guinea. Even their current successes, Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, could easily become failures in the near future if action is not taken to end the famines and insurgencies in these states. Indeed, each of these states continues to maintain extensive trade linkages with the West. Benin and the Congo remain firmly in the socialist camp and provide good case studies for the Soviet method of extending its influence in sub-saharan Africa: (a) massive infusions of military aid, delivered quickly, and at convenient interest rates; (b) the signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation as well as economic and technical assistance agreements (these agreements have the effect of linking the foreign policy of the recipient state to that of the Soviet Union...the economic agreements begin a dependency relationship); (c) the establishment of a military presence in the country with Soviet advisors or proxies from Cuba or the Eastern Bloc (no Soviet units are sent); (d) and finally an extensive involvement in building/controlling the administrative infrastructure of government, security, the military, and the vanguard party. This last step has led to most of the Soviet setbacks in sub-saharan Africa as it often made the governments feel as though they were being re-colonized.

The Soviets have been more reliable in their security assistance programs largely because they can operate without the constraints that the US faces (moral, participatory

government, and the like). Nevertheless, friends of the US have benefited more as their security has been enhanced both physically and economically. As a result, future trends will likely favor more conversions to the "American way" as long as the United States has the will to resource its security assistance programs on the continent.

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